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Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) are emerging as a promising and convenient nextgeneration wireless network technology. A typical WMN consists of wireless mesh routers
and mesh stations (clients). A mesh router/station discovers paths to reach other mesh
routers/stations using a path selection protocol known as the Hybrid Wireless Mesh Protocol
(HWMP). HWMP is prone to different types of external and internal, routing, and content
modification attacks. Hence, a secure framework for HWMP in WMNs is needed. Although
several secure versions of HWMP have been proposed, a comprehensive approach that
provides a strong end-to-end/point-to-point authentication and integrity services to protect
the contents of the HWMP frames has yet to be developed.
This dissertation proposes a security framework of the routing protocol, which
provides and ensures end-to-end as well as point-to-point authentication and integrity to both
mutable and non-mutable fields of the routing frames of HWMP by adding message
extension fields to all five HWMP path selection frame elements (path request, path reply,
root announcement, path error, and gate announcement). Using the extension fields, the
detailed protocol of secure HWMP is proposed in both the path discovery phase (path request
and path reply) and the path maintenance phase (gate announcement, root announcement, and
path error).
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1

Overview of Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs)
Rapid growth in the size of deployed wireless networks has led to certain

architectural limitations in providing wireless services. The use cases of wireless networks
are expanding daily, as the Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) is required to provide
services to larger areas with minimum infrastructure, an initiative that, in many cases,
involves replacing Ethernet cables with wireless links. With the need for more efficient
systems, Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) have surfaced as one of the key technologies for
next-generation wireless networking because of their apparent advantages over other wireless
networks. Thus, IEEE expanded its standards in 2011 with the 802.11s amendment that
focused on wireless mesh networking and its implementation. In particular, the nodes of a
WMN are capable of dynamic self-organization and self-configuration, thereby automatically
establishing an adhoc network while maintaining mesh connectivity. Further, mesh networks
diversify the capabilities of adhoc networks by offering many benefits, such as low cost,
simplified network maintenance, and robust and reliable coverage. As a result, WMNs are
being heavily commercialized in application areas like broadband home and community
networking, automation, and metropolitan area and enterprise networking.
1.1.1

Benefits of WMNs
1

Implementing the WMN concept according to the IEEE 802.11s standard has its own
merits over wired networks and WLANs, such as flexibility, efficient backhaul, selforganization, self-repair, and security.
1.1.1.1 Flexibility
Flexibility is one of the most important benefits of using WMNs. In a traditional
wired network, many access points (APs) connect to different ports on the switch, thereby,
necessitating a switch with as many ports as there are access points. The benefit of wireless
networks is that only one AP needs to connect to a wired network through a switch. Other
APs in the network connect through the fixed AP. Those APs that are not within the
communication range with the fixed AP can find a path through other APs in the network,
forming a WMN. The key benefit of WMNs over Ethernet connection is that the WMN
allows an AP to find the best path through other APs in order to reach the destination AP or
the wired network.
1.1.1.2 Backhaul
Backhaul in a WMN refers to the mesh cloud that consists of several APs. These APs
together form the backhaul network of the WMN by transporting data from multiple users
back to the wired network. Given the benefit of flexibility in WMNs over traditional wired
infrastructure, the backhaul in the WMN is highly efficient due to its capacity for multiple
path selection.
1.1.1.3 Self-Organization
Another key benefit of the WMN over WLANs is its ability to self-organize. Mesh
stations follow an algorithm to find the best path to the wired network. Thus, adding new
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mesh stations to the network is considerably easy and merely involves ensuring that the new
stations are within the communication range of other APs in the mesh cloud.
1.1.1.4 Self-Repair
WMNs also provide the advantage of being able to self-repair. Since WMNs offer
multiple paths to connect a mesh station to a wired network, the mesh station is able to
connect to the wired network through the best path available. Thus, if an AP in the path is
removed or damaged, the mesh station finds an alternate path to the destination and re-routes
the traffic through the new path, making the management of WMNs inexpensive.
1.1.1.5 Security
In order to form a WMN, mesh stations perform peering with other stations. Because
of this peering process, provisioning security features to protect the genuine mesh stations
from peering with rogue stations is of prime importance.

Authenticated Mesh Peering

Exchange (AMPE) is a secure protocol implemented by WMNs in which the mesh stations
generate a Pairwise Master Key (PMK) using secure algorithms, such as Simultaneous
Authentication or Equals (SAE).
1.1.2 Issues with WMNs
Many issues are associated with using WMNs. As the mesh node population of the
network increases so does the network’s overall latency. This is based on the increased
number of hops in the network that result from routing the traffic. Scalability is also an issue
with single mesh networks because the overall system capacity decreases as mesh stations
are added to the network. Mesh stations need to be equipped with multiple radios so that the
backhaul operation is handled on a separate frequency, thereby increasing the overall system
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capacity.

In terms of security, in the absence of adequate monitoring and control

mechanisms, WMNs are vulnerable to unauthorized access attacks because of their routing
ability from multiple nodes.
1.1.3 Network Elements of WMNs
WMNs consist of the following key network elements, as described in the IEEE
802.11s standard [16]:


Station: Any device that contains an IEEE 802.11-conformant Medium Access
Layer (MAC) and physical (PHY) layer interface to the wireless medium.



Access Point (AP): Any entity that has station functionality and provides access
to the distribution services via the wireless medium for associated stations.



Mesh Station (STA): A wireless mesh station that implements the mesh facility.
In Figure 1.1, all depicted nodes are mesh stations except H, I, K, L, N, O, Q, and
R, which are 802.11 clients or non-AP mesh stations.



Mesh Gate: Any entity that has mesh station functionality and provides access to
one or more distribution systems via the wireless medium for the mesh Basic
Service Set (BSS). In Figure 1.1, the nodes F, J, and M are mesh gates.



Mesh BSS: A BSS that forms a self-contained network of mesh stations. A
mesh BSS contains zero or more mesh gates. All nodes containing the mesh
point or mesh station functionality run a mesh BSS.
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Portal: The logical point at which the integration service is provided. This is the
node that bridges between 802.11 and non-802.11 networks. In Figure 1.1, the
nodes F, M, and P are portals that bridge the wireless (802.11) and wired
networks.



Mesh Coordination Function (MCF): A coordination function that combines
aspects of the contention-based and scheduled access methods.

The MCF

includes the functionality provided by both enhanced distributed channel access
and MCF-controlled channel access (MCCA).


Mesh Controlled Channel Access (MCCA): A coordination function for the
mesh BSS.



Precursor: A neighboring peer mesh station on the mesh path to the destination
mesh station that identifies the mesh station as the next-hop mesh station.



Source: A mesh station from which a MAC service data unit (MSDU) enters the
mesh BSS. A source mesh station may be a mesh station that is the source of an
MSDU or a proxy mesh gate that receives an MSDU from a station outside of the
mesh BSS and then forwards the MSDU on a mesh path.

1.1.4 Architecture Overview of WMNs

5

Figure 1.1 shows the architecture and network elements of a typical WMN.
According to the IEEE 802.11s standard, the names and functions of the wireless network
elements—such as gateways, stations, and access points—have been changed.

Figure 1.1 WMN architecture overview

The stations Q, R, N, O, K, L, H, and I are wireless client stations and do not require
802.11s mesh functionality in order to connect to the Internet through their respective access
points. Stations C, A, D, B, G, F, E, M, and J are defined as mesh stations. Typically, a
mesh station is an access point that supports the mesh functionality. Mesh functionality is

6

the set of functions, features, and frame formats that enable the wireless mesh operation. The
mesh cloud, which is formally known as the mesh BSS, is defined as the collection of mesh
stations that transfer messages by establishing wireless peer-to-peer links. Using a mesh
backhaul, mesh stations that are not in a direct communication range exchange messages
through other intermediate mesh stations. Mesh clouds connect to the infrastructure BSS
through a logical component, the Distribution System (DS), thereby allowing the
communication between mesh and non-mesh stations within the network. The logical term
for the interconnection between the mesh BSS and the DS is formally called a mesh gate. A
mesh gate is a logical function that is defined as the translation between a mesh BSS and a
non-mesh BSS. Stations S, M, J, and P in Figure 1.1 are APs, with APs being defined as a
central transit point for the wireless client stations that send the 802.11 frames to other
stations or to a wired network. Stations M and P also perform the additional function of
translating between the wireless and the wired network. An AP that performs such a
translation is referred to as a Portal, which is a logical component.
There are three types of frames in 802.11: data, management, and control frames.
Data frames are used to transport higher layer data while control frames are used to handle
reservations and acknowledgments. Wireless devices use management frames for setting up,
organizing, and maintaining a typical WLAN.

The IEEE 802.11s amendment adds

additional mesh control fields to the data and management frames to accommodate for multihop communication, as shown in Figure 1.2. The mesh control field consists of the following
fields: mesh flags, Time-To-Live (TTL), mesh sequence number, and mesh address
extension. The sequence number and TTL are used in the WMN to prevent the frames from
being stuck in an infinite loop. Mesh stations that communicate over a single-hop do not
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transmit the mesh control field in the frames being transmitted. The address extension mode
in the mesh flags suggests if any additional MAC addresses are embedded in the mesh
control field. The address extension field is capable of accommodating six MAC addresses,
which is especially useful when the source and destination devices use proxy mesh stations,
as these are located outside the mesh network.

Figure 1.2 Mesh frame format

1.1.5 Formation of a WMN
A mesh station goes through three essential steps, which are detailed in the following
subsections, in order to form a WMN with other mesh stations in the network.
1.1.5.1 Discovery
After a mesh station’s initial boot up, it must form a mesh network by discovering
and associating with fellow mesh stations/APs in the network.

Mesh stations perform

scanning using standard active and passive mechanisms. Mesh stations in a mesh cloud send
8

beacons out into the network as well as probe responses to probe requests. The 802.11s
standard includes several new elements, formally known as the mesh profile, in the
broadcasts and probes of mesh stations, which are not present in the standard 802.11 frame.
The mesh profile consists of parameters that define the attributes of a mesh cloud. These
attributes consist of a mesh ID and a mesh configuration element with many subfields that
describe a mesh station’s mesh functionality. Any two mesh stations in a mesh cloud share
the same mesh profile, with peering possible only between mesh stations with similar mesh
profiles. As a part of the discovery process, each mesh station sends out mesh beacons,
which are different from the standard 802.11 beacons. If the mesh station is also an AP, it
sends out two beacons due to this dual functionality.
1.1.5.2 Peering
After the discovery phase, a mesh station associates with its neighboring mesh
station(s) using a mesh peering mechanism to form peer mesh stations that can communicate
with one another. In some cases, multiple peering sessions are established between two mesh
stations that are implementing the peering mechanism. Peering uses three types of frames to
initiate, manage, and terminate the mesh peering process: Mesh Peering Open Frames, Mesh
Peering Confirm Frames, and Mesh Peering Close Frames.
When a mesh station A discovers a neighboring mesh station B with the same mesh
profile, a Mesh Peering Open Frame is sent by the peering initiator station (station A)
offering to peer with station B. Station B, the peering responder, responds by sending a Mesh
Peering Confirm Frame to station A. As mesh peering is a bidirectional process, the above
procedure repeats between stations A and B, swapping their roles. Peering is considered to be
established between two mesh stations only after both the participating mesh stations accept
9

the Mesh Peering Confirm Frames from one another. As long as the mesh stations are within
each other’s communication range and have the same mesh profile, peering is maintained. A
mesh station can terminate peering by sending a Mesh Peering Close Frame if it does not
hear back from its peer for a certain period of time or if no response is received after a certain
number of frame re-transmissions.
1.1.5.3 Security
Mesh stations in an IEEE 802.11s WMN implement an authentication algorithm
known as the SAE. This algorithm provides mutual authentication between any two mesh
stations and generates a PMK that is used to encrypt the frame that will be transmitted
between them. Unlike the traditional 802.11 encryption, the SAE is independent of keying
hierarchy. Furthermore, the two mesh stations implementing the SAE adopt a distributed
approach by initiating the algorithm simultaneously. The link between the two mesh stations
is secured due to the pairwise encryption that is implemented by using the PMK. The
downside to this method is that there is no end-to-end encryption for the frames, which are,
thus, vulnerable to modification attacks. With each new peering that is established, a mesh
station is required to update its broadcast key so that the broadcast frames reach all of its
authenticated peers.
1.2

Security in Wireless Mesh Networks
WMNs facilitate a distributed network architecture, which dramatically increases the

ease of setting up wireless access infrastructure. However, frequent changes in network
topology and the conglomeration of various wireless mediums creates a greater concern for
security in WMNs today. The security of the traffic in a WMN is of particular interest to
many researchers because of a lack of comprehensive security frameworks for the different
10

types of mesh networks. More specifically, the confidentiality of the data being transmitted
must be ensured through proper message encryption techniques to protect the data from
being altered while en route from the source node to the destination. On the other hand,
routing traffic is equally important when considering security protection because this traffic
is handled by intermediate mesh stations and thereby offer a larger scope of traffic for rogue
stations to tamper and create chaos with.

Strong key agreement schemes are required to

detect such attacks in the network that are targeted at routing traffic. Currently, many WMN
products in the market use different approaches to providing security to mesh devices. Most
of these products have a security mechanism adopted from existing adhoc networks’ security
mechanisms as well as 802.11i security infrastructure.
Some of the common threats to WMNs are packet modification, packet relay/delay,
and node insertion. To overcome these threats, core security principles must be addressed to
develop a strong security framework, and security goals must be established and tailored
specifically for WMNs.

Basic security features, such as confidentiality, availability,

authentication, integrity, and access control, must be provided for a strong and secure WMN.
However, the dynamic nature of a WMN poses many challenges in terms of
providing security. One of the causes of network failures can be attributed to a physical
compromise of the mesh stations in the network. The multi-hop nature of a WMN increases
the complexity involved in securing the network from vulnerability. Due to the dynamic
changes that occur in a WMN because of the frequent connection and disconnection of users
from the network, a static secure configuration is not feasible. Also, characteristics such as
power constraints and the mobility of the nodes in the network make a common security
solution framework inapplicable to the mesh stations, APs, and client devices within the
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network. This is dependent on the computational ability and resources available for the
various types of devices in the network.
The IEEE 802.11s standard provides a security mechanism known as SAE, which
uses finite field cryptography in which the nodes authenticate each other with a password.
However, this scheme provides authentication for nodes, not for routing protocols. Routing
the data link layer (layer 2) is introduced in the 802.11s standard and uses a routing protocol
known as Hybrid Wireless Mesh Protocol (HWMP), which employs MAC addresses instead
of an Internet Protocol (IP) addressing scheme while routing. HWMP is based on the Adhoc
On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol [17] and works in either proactive or
on-demand mode. The focus of research in this paper is based on securing the standard
version of HWMP by incorporating cryptographic primitives.
The wireless medium, as well as the non-infrastructure nature of WMNs, makes them
increasingly vulnerable to a number of attacks. In wired networks, an attacker requires
access to the physical medium in order to launch an attack. In the case of wireless networks,
an intruder can easily eavesdrop on the ongoing traffic.

Since there is no centralized

infrastructure, it is very difficult to establish a Key Distribution Center (KDC) or a trusted
Certification Authority (CA) with which to provide cryptographic keys and digital
certificates to help nodes authenticate themselves.

Attacks on wireless mesh routing

protocols fall into two categories: routing-disruption attacks and resource consumption
attacks. During a routing-disruption attack, the attacker attempts to route legitimate data
frames in dysfunctional ways. A good example of this kind of routing attack is a scenario in
which an attacker induces forged routing frames that then create a routing loop, thus causing
the frames to travel through the nodes in a cycle, preventing them from reaching their
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destinations and resulting in energy and bandwidth consumption.

During a resource

consumption attack, the attacker may inject frames into the network in an attempt to exhaust
network resources, such as bandwidth, or to exhaust the resources of a node, such as
computation power or memory storage. Research shows that HWMP is vulnerable to several
routing attacks, such as wormhole attacks, routing disruption attacks, and flooding attacks.
These attacks target the mutable fields of the frames that are exchanged in this protocol since
the mutable fields change at every intermediate node and are prone to modification by
malicious nodes.
The route discovery process in HWMP begins with a source mesh station
broadcasting a path request (PREQ) frame in an effort to find a path to the destination. These
PREQ frames contain two types of fields: mutable and non-mutable. Mutable fields in these
frames, such as TTL, hop-count and metric, change from hop to hop while non-mutable
fields stay the same from the source to the destination. The authentication of mutable fields
is challenging when compared to the authentication of non-mutable fields because every
intermediate mesh node that receives the frame has to verify the integrity of the mutable
fields and then append authentication information for further propagation. Several internal
attacks can be performed based on the lack of a proper security framework for mutable and
non-mutable fields.
1.3

Related Work
Prior research exists on securing the layer-2 routing protocol HWMP. Islam et al. [6]

proposed a variation of HWMP called Secure HWMP or SHWMP, a routing protocol that
utilized the existing key hierarchy of 802.11s, identified the mutable and non-mutable fields
in the routing message, protected the non-mutable portion using symmetric encryption, and
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authenticated mutable information using Merkle tree. To validate their work, the authors
discussed possible attacks that can be launched in HWMP for path selection. However,
SHWMP does not address the issue of internal attacks.
In an effort to secure HWMP, Ben-Othman et al. [18] proposed a security scheme
rooted in Identity-Based Cryptography (IBC). A MAC address is used as the public key of
the path request and the path reply messages that contain mutable fields. Both internal and
external problems that exist in HWMP are identified in this work. Ben-Othman and Benitez
[20] implemented the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) technique to
provide security in HWMP, namely in PREQ and path reply (PREP) messages. However,
only mutable fields are considered. These two schemes do not provide end-to-end and pointto-point integrity service for non-mutable fields. Both schemes require a private key to sign
the mutable fields while public keys are distributed for signature verification. ECDSAHWMP requires the transmission of a digital certificate to the station that is verifying the
signature. Yet, having a certification authority is not practical in WMNs.
Watchdog-HWMP [22] discusses a scheme for detecting illogical changes in the
mutable fields and incorporates a forgery detection mechanism. In this scheme, when the
stations transmit the PREQ frames, they will receive the PREQs that are propagated by their
neighbors. Therefore, the transmitting station can check to see if the mutable fields are
modified correctly and identify any illogical changes. This method provides a watchdog
monitoring of the mutable fields but cannot detect illegal modification of the non-mutable
fields.
Tan et al. [19] discussed the various kinds of attacks on HWMP and then listed the
protocol’s vulnerabilities based on those attacks. The paper also placed greater emphasis on
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investigating the protection of routing messages over data messages.

Various security

requirements were determined based on the authors’ analysis of HWMP vulnerabilities while
several existing security protocols were analyzed for their security requirements and
compared in terms of quantitative complexity. General recommendations were ultimately
made for a secure version of HWMP based on the authors’ security analysis.
Since the existing schemes cover only part of the security—either internal or external
attacks, mutable fields or non-mutable fields, end-to-end or point-to-point authentication—
there is still a need to address all issues in a combined framework. Thus, such a combined
security framework is proposed in Chapter 4 of this dissertation. In this dissertation, the use
of signature schemes is reduced to the minimum extent possible in order to reduce the
computation complexity in the mesh stations.
1.4

Dissertation Motivation and Contribution
The motivation of this dissertation is to provide a secure framework for HWMP that

provides end-to-end as well as point-to-point authentication and integrity security features for
both mutable and non-mutable fields.

This will be accomplished by employing

cryptographic techniques that are efficient in terms of computation complexity and state-ofthe-art in terms of robustness.
The primary contribution of this dissertation will be an identification of the security
concerns of HWMP in WMNs and a secured version of the routing protocol that ensures endto-end as well as point-to-point authentication and the integrity of both the mutable and nonmutable fields of the routing frames of HWMP.
1.5

Dissertation Organization
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The dissertation is organized in the following manner. In Chapter 2, an overview of
HWMP is provided along with descriptions of several possible types of attacks and strategies
for securing against such attacks. A system model, which includes both a network model and
attack model, is also outlined in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, the cryptographic schemes used in
the proposed approach and the necessary cryptographic preliminaries are explained. The
proposed security framework for HWMP is discussed in Chapter 4, which also describes
enhancements to the existing HWMP to protect the fields in the routing frames. In Chapter
5, the security requirements for WMNs are discussed. This chapter also discusses how the
proposed scheme complies with the suggested security requirements and evaluates the
effectiveness of the proposed scheme through a heuristic security analysis. Later, in Chapter
6, a performance evaluation of the proposed scheme with simulation results is detailed.
Chapter 7 discusses the hardware implementation efforts of the proposed secure version of
HWMP as well as the current status of the implementation. Finally, Chapter 8 provides the
conclusion for the proposed work along with plans for further research.
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CHAPTER 2

HYBRID WIRELESS MESH PROTOCOL

This chapter overviews HWMP, defines possible attacks on HWMP, and describes
the system model (network model and attack model) used in this dissertation.
2.1

HWMP Overview
Path selection in 802.11s is defined as the process by which a mesh station discovers

a path to a given destination that is either a wired network or another mesh station with a
MAC address in the mesh cloud. HWMP is the default frame routing protocol for the MPs,
as mandated by the IEEE 802.11s draft specification. It is a combination of reactive (or ondemand) and proactive routing, which gives the mesh points the added advantage of
discovering the best routes. The primitives of HWMP are derived from the AODV routing
protocol used for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs), which can operate in two modes:
on-demand mode and proactive mode.
The on-demand mode is useful for mesh points because it enables peer-to-peer route
communication in the absence of root node configuration and in certain circumstances when
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a root node is present. In proactive mode, mesh points maintain routes to the root stations in
a proactive manner, and a routing table is maintained based on the distance vectors.
The aforementioned modes can act in conjunction with one another, as they are not
exclusive in nature. The difference between reactive and proactive protocols is that, in a
reactive protocol, the nodes will compute a route only when one is required whereas, in a
proactive protocol, the nodes know the routes to all the nodes at all times. Reactive protocols
enjoy the benefit of reduced control overhead but suffer from latency because of the time that
it takes for the route to be laid out first. Meanwhile, proactive protocols enjoy the benefit of
minimal latency but suffer from an increased overhead in terms of the long-term storage of
unused routes, especially when the network topology rapidly changes. As a hybrid of the
reactive and proactive elements of routing, HWMP benefits from the best features of each
routing protocol. It creates and stores routes to gateway and root stations proactively while
also using on-demand routing for establishing peer-to-peer communication [10].
For path management in WMNs, HWMP Mesh Path Selection frames are used.
These frames are essentially Action frames with the action category set to Mesh and the
Subtype set to HWMP Mesh Path Selection.

Depending on the type of action to be

accomplished by the frame, the different elements in a HWMP Mesh Path Selection frame
are the PREQ, PREP, path error (PERR), root announcement (RANN), and gate
announcement (GANN).

The PREQ and PREP are primarily responsible for the path

discovery process in a WMN. These elements and the various frame formats are described in
the sections that follow.
2.1.1

Gate Announcement
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A mesh BSS may contain one or more mesh gates that connect to one or more DSs.
A mesh gate can announce its presence in the mesh BSS by sending GANN frames.
Alternatively, a mesh gate can announce its presence in the mesh BSS by sending HWMP
path selection frames with the RANN element or the PREQ element, indicating its role as a
mesh gate, when it is configured as a root mesh station. Typically, a mesh gate announces its
presence when it is collocated with a portal or has access to a portal. The GANN allows
mesh stations to select the appropriate mesh gate and builds a path towards it. It should be
noted that, when multiple mesh gates are present in the mesh BSS that have access to the
same DS, proper configuration is necessary. When a mesh gate has access to IEEE 802
stations outside the mesh BSS, the mesh gate acts as a proxy for these IEEE 802 stations.
Such a mesh gate is called a proxy mesh gate. The format of the GANN element is shown in
Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1 GANN element format

2.1.2

Root Announcement
This section describes the function, generation, and processing of the RANN element.

The RANN element is used for announcing the presence of a mesh station that is configured
19

as a root mesh station. RANN elements are sent out periodically by a root mesh station. The
RANN element propagates path metric information across the network so that each mesh
station can select a best metric path to the announced root mesh station. This mechanism
allows bidirectional trees to be built, using a robust procedure based on individually
addressed frames that are initiated by the mesh stations. This procedure makes the root mesh
station aware of all mesh stations. The root mesh station periodically propagates a RANN
element into the network. The information contained in the RANN is used to disseminate
path metrics for other stations to reach the root mesh station, but reception of a RANN alone
does not “establish a path.”
Upon reception of a RANN, each mesh station that has to create or refresh a path to
the root mesh station sends an individually addressed PREQ to the root mesh station via the
mesh station from which it received the RANN. The root mesh station sends PREP in
response to each PREQ. The individually addressed PREQ creates the reverse path from the
root mesh station to the originator mesh station while the PREP creates the forward path
from the mesh station to the root mesh station [13]. The RANN element is transmitted in a
HWMP mesh path selection frame. The HWMP mesh path selection frame is transmitted by
a mesh station to establish, update, or delete paths to other mesh stations using HWMP. This
frame is transmitted in an individually or group-addressed frame, depending on the contained
elements. The format of the RANN element is shown in Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2 RANN element format

2.1.3

Path Request
This section describes the function, generation, and processing of the PREQ element.

The PREQ element is used for discovering a path to one or more target mesh stations as well
as performing path maintenance (optional), building a proactive (reverse) path selection tree
to the root mesh station, and confirming a path to a target mesh station (optional). The
PREQ element is transmitted in an HWMP mesh path selection frame. The format of the
PREQ element is shown in Figure 2.3.

Figure 2.3 PREQ element

2.1.4

Path Reply
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This section describes the function, generation, and processing of the PREP element.
The PREP element is transmitted in individually addressed frames. The purpose of the PREP
is either to establish the forward path to a target mesh station or to a target proxy mesh gate.
The PREP element can also be used to confirm the reverse path to the originator or to verify
that a target is reachable. The PREP is issued in response to a PREQ and is transmitted in an
HWMP mesh path selection frame. The format of the PREP element is shown in Figure 2.4.

Figure 2.4 PREP element format

2.1.5

Path Error
This section describes the function, generation, and processing of the path error

(PERR) element. The PERR element is used for announcing an unreachable destination and
is transmitted in an HWMP mesh path selection frame. This selection frame is transmitted
by a mesh station to establish, update, or delete paths to other mesh stations using HWMP.
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This frame is transmitted in an individually or group-addressed frame, depending on the
contained elements. The format of the PERR element is shown in Figure 2.5.

Figure 2.5 PERR element format

2.2

Possible Attacks on HWMP
Generally, routing protocols are vulnerable to both external and internal attacks. In

external attacks, an illegitimate node will try to access the nodes in the network and
compromise one or more of them. Internal attacks are launched by already authenticated
nodes within the network based on collusion or other reasons. The following sections detail
the types of attacks that HWMPs may face.
2.2.1 Flooding Attacks
This is a denial of service attack. The primary goal is to make the network run out of
resources by flooding it with a large number of PREQs to either one or many destinations
that may or may not be present in the network. PREQs to unknown destinations will ensure
that they are propagated multiple times until the time-to-live goes to zero. The scale of the
number of requests could be anywhere from a few hundred to thousands until the network
reaches its saturation level and then fails to handle PREQs any longer due to overload.
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Another method that the attacker can use is to broadcasting a large number of RANNs with
multiple root mesh station addresses. In an attempt to respond to the RANN, the mesh
stations will request a path to reach the root station, thereby leading to a large number of
PREQs and network saturation thereafter. When the attacker knows the paths, false PERR
frames can be sent in an attempt to report an error. This will cause the mesh stations to
delete the routing information that they have stored for the targets as mentioned by the
attacker in the error report.
2.2.2 Path Diversion Attacks
Control information related to routing is carried in the routing protocol frames. Hop
count, sequence number, and path metric are some of the fields that are modified by every
intermediate mesh station. Therefore, a malicious station could intercept the traffic and
modify any or all of these fields to disrupt the desired communication by redirecting the
traffic in different paths. An attacker could modify the sequence number to divert the traffic
through this malicious station by falsely advertising a route to the destination with a higher
sequence number than the authentic sequence number. Similarly, the attacker could attempt
to divert the traffic through this station by falsely claiming that it has a shorter route to the
destination station, which can be achieved by lowering the hop count or path metric.
2.2.3 Wormhole/Black hole Attacks
An attacker can make use of these types of attacks to spy on the data frames between
mesh stations. Essentially, an attacker can create a black hole by first accomplishing a path
diversion attack, thereby ensuring that the traffic goes through the attacker. After this, the
attacker can choose to drop all the frames that are received or can tunnel these frames
directly to the one-hop neighbors of the destination mesh station, forcing them to discard any
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other route requests to the destination and to select the route through the attacker as the best
path, known as a wormhole attack.
2.2.4 Impersonation Attacks
The attacker can impersonate other mesh stations and generate a path request by
modifying the originator and target address in the path request frame. In this type of attack,
the attacker will replace the originator address of the PREQ frame with another mesh
station’s address that it wants to impersonate and then broadcast this message. When a mesh
station receives this PREQ, it will assume that the originator is not the attacker but the other
mesh station and will reply with a PREP. Now, the attacker has successfully diverted the
traffic between these two mesh stations through itself.
2.2.5 Replay Attacks
This type of attack can be launched by either external or internal nodes and can be
considered as a man-in-the-middle attack because of its nature. An external attacker that can
intercept the traffic between any mesh stations in the network can later use the information
gathered to transmit legitimate frames in order to gain access into the network without being
suspected. Once the attacker successful convinces the internal mesh stations that it is indeed
a legitimate station, it can gather the authentication information. Similarly, an internal
malicious mesh station within the network can intercept the message exchanges between two
mesh stations if it is an intermediate station between the communicating stations. The
malicious station can use this information later to transmit the data and gain access to
unauthorized parts of the network.
2.2.6 Passive Attacks
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These are attacks that do not involve the active participation of the attacker, except
for eavesdropping on the network traffic to gather information about route establishments by
the mesh stations in the network. Usually, this information is sent to active attackers from
time to time who then carry out aforementioned attacks on the mesh stations in the network.
One such example of a passive attack is that of an attacker that impersonates the root mesh
station and broadcasts route announcements to gather information about the existing mesh
stations, such as their MAC addresses.
2.2.7

Internal Attacks
Often, internal attacks have different goals than external attacks. Internal attackers

already possess the authentication keys/secrets and are authorized users of the WMN.
Instead of flooding the network, internal attackers may create black holes/wormholes to
attain a major share of the network bandwidth by sinking the data packets of other mesh
stations. This will hardly interrupt the normal operations of the network but may result in the
network being monopolized by the attacker. Internal attackers may also be interested in
eavesdropping on the data packets by creating path diversion attacks. Thus, the mutable and
non-mutable fields of the HWMP frames must be secured against internal attacks through
strong authentication schemes.
2.3

Security Against Attacks on HWMP
The primary objective of securing a WMN is to prevent external attackers from

gaining access to the network resources. This can be achieved by using secure authentication
protocols, such as SAE and 802.1x authentications. The integrity of the frames must be
ensured so that attackers will be unable to modify the contents of the frames. This can be
achieved by employing message integrity code in the frames.
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Protecting the privacy of the frames is another important security requirement for
HWMP frames to maintain confidentiality. Any or all of the frames must be encrypted using
advanced encryption algorithms to prevent attackers from gaining access to the contents of
the frames.

To thwart external attacks, link-to-link based security services, such as

encryption, authentication, and message integrity code, should be employed. Another major
problem in WMN security is providing protection against internal attacks as attackers can
create black holes with which to eavesdrop on the data packets by impersonating either a root
mesh station or any other mesh station. To protect the non-mutable fields of the frames, endto-end security authentication and integrity schemes can be used to prevent any malicious
node from impersonating another mesh station or a root mesh station. Since preventing the
malicious nodes from modifying the mutable fields of the frames is not easy, efficient
forgery detection methods are needed so that the mesh stations can detect any forged mutable
fields.
2.4

System Model
In this section, the network and attack models used in the design of the proposed

scheme are discussed.
2.4.1 Network Model
A typical WMN architecture is considered for the proposed scheme in which the
network consists of a number of mesh stations that have mesh network capabilities and are
typically routers. These mesh stations with access point functionality, known as Mesh
Access Points (MAPs), allow mesh clients to connect to the Internet. The Mesh Portal (MP)
acts as a gateway between the WMN and other 802.11 networks. The WMN in the proposed
scheme is modeled as an undirected labeled graph G(V, E), where V is the set of nodes and E
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is the set of links of the graph. A link is considered to exist between two mesh stations if the
stations are within one another’s communication range. Each station in the network is
considered to be a vertex of the graph, and the communication links between the nodes are
assumed to have bidirectional edges in nature.
2.4.2 Attack Model
In the design of the proposed scheme, an active-x-y attacker model [23] is used
wherein an active adversary controls x adversarial nodes and uses y compromised identifiers.
The attacker defined for the current scheme is an active-1-1 attacker. The communication
capabilities of the attacker are assumed to be comparable to those of an average node in the
WMN. This means that an attacker will only be able to hear the frames that are transmitted
by neighboring mesh stations. Similarly, any frames transmitted by the attacker will only be
heard by its neighboring mesh stations.
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CHAPTER 3

CRYPTOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND

In this chapter, three existing cryptographic schemes are introduced, followed by the
rationale for using those schemes and the methods with which they have been applied in this
dissertation.
3.1

Identity-Based Online-Offline Signature Scheme
Identity-Based Signatures [9] are defined as follows:
If x1 , , xn are bit strings, we denote by x1 || || xn a string encoding of x1 , , xn from
which the constituent objects are uniquely recoverable. If x is a string, | x | denotes
its length, and if S is a set, then | S | is its cardinality. If A is a randomized
$
algorithm, y 

A( x1 , x2 , ) means that A has inputs x1 , x 2  and that y is assigned

the output of A . We measure the resources of an adversary, such as its running time
and its number of oracle queries, asymptotically in terms of an underlying security
parameter k . A function v(k ) is said to be negligible (in k ) if, for all c  N , there
exists k c  N , such that v(k )  k c for all k  k c .
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An identity-based signature (IBS) scheme is a quadruple of algorithms, IBS = (Setup,
KeyDer, Sign, Vf), with a polynomial running time in the security parameter k . The ﬁrst
three may be randomized, but the last is not. The trusted key distribution center runs the
setup algorithm Setup on input 1k to obtain a master public and secret key pair (mpk , msk ) .
(Here, 1k is the unary notation of the security parameter k .) To generate the secret signing
key usk for the user with the identity id {0, 1}* , the scheme runs the key derivation algorithm
KeyDer on input msk and id . The signing key is assumed to be securely communicated to

the user in question. On input usk and a message M , the signing algorithm Sign returns a
signature  of M . On input mpk , id , M and a signature  , the veriﬁcation algorithm Vf
returns 1 if  is valid for id and M ; otherwise, it returns 0. Correctness requires that
Vf (mpk , id , M , Sign(usk , M ))  1 with probability one for all k  N and id , M {0,1}* whenever

the keys mpk , M , usk are generated, as indicated above.
To safeguard the non-mutable fields of HWMP packets, we consider the use of an
efficient elliptic curve cryptography (ECC)-based online/offline identity-based signature
scheme [1] that does not require a certificate to be attached to the signature for verification
and does not require any pairing operation in either the signature generation or verification.
More importantly, this offline signing algorithm does not require any secret key information.
Thus, it can be pre-computed by a private key generator (PKG), and the offline information
can be re-used. This is a great advantage in WMN environments as the offline information
can be hard-coded to the mesh node in the manufacturing or setup stage. It can also eliminate
any communication between the mesh node and the root node for the offline signing, which
is considered to be a costly factor in WMNs. The length of this (pre-computed) offline
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information, which can be considered as public parameters, is about 160 group elements. It
may be considered long for signing only a few messages, but if the mesh station requires
signing a thousand, or even a million messages, these group elements are negligible when
compared to the quantity of those messages. Thus, this scheme is scalable for large-scale
networks.
The scheme contains five components, which are described as follows:


Setup: Let G be a multiplicative group of prime order q. The PKG selects a
random generator g ∊ G and indiscriminately chooses x ∊
Let H:{0,1} 

. It also sets X = gx.

be a cryptographic hash function. The public parameters

param and master secret key (MSK) msk are given by
param = {G,q,g,X,H} and msk = x .


(3.1)

Extract: To generate a secret key for identity ID, the PKG randomly selects r ∊
and computes
R  gr

s  r + H(R,ID)x mod q .

(3.2)

The user secret key is (R, s). Note that a correctly generated secret key should
fulfill the equality:
gs =


(3.3)

Offline sign: At the offline sign stage, the signer computes
Ῠi =

for i = 0,…..,|q| - 1 .

(3.4)

Note that, at the offline stage, we do not require knowledge of the message or the
secret key. These can be regarded as a part of the public parameter and prepared
by the PKG instead of the offline signing state.
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Online sign: At the online stage, the signer randomly selects y ∊

. Let y[i] be

the i-th bit of y. Define ӳ⊂{1,….,|q|} to be the set of indices so that y[i] = 1.
Compute
Y∏∊

,

(3.5)

p  H(Y,R,m) ,

(3.6)

z  y + ps mod q .

(3.7)

and

The signature is (Y, R, z).


Verify: To verify this signature (Y, R, z) for message m and identity ID, the
verifier first computes p  H(Y,R,m) and then checks whether
gz ≟ YRpXpH(R,ID) .

(3.8)

If it is equal, accept; otherwise, reject.
In order to implement this scheme on the mesh nodes, ECC is employed based on the
small key size and low computational overhead.

ECC primitives in MIRACL library

(explained in Chapter 6) with a 160-bit key size are used. Although the normal size of the
signature is 120 bytes, it can be split into two phases instead of using the entire signature
every time. This is possible because the R in the signature will be constant for all the
signatures generated by a particular mesh node and, therefore, can be sent once at the
beginning of the communication. In the first phase, the size of the packet is 40 bytes (R = 40
bytes); in the second phase, the size of the packet is 97 bytes (Y = 40 bytes, Z = 20 bytes, and
payload = 37 bytes). Payload consists of the non-mutable fields of the HWMP PREQ frame.
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The size of the payload may vary between 37 to 252 bytes, depending on the number of
destinations in the PREQ frame.
3.2

Multi-Source Broadcast Encryption (MSBE)
The BE scheme [2] can be explained through the following scenario:
Suppose there are n subscribers, and S represents the set of subscribers to which a

message needs to be broadcasted securely. A simple way of doing this is to assign a
Public Key  Secret Key pair to each of the n subscribers. The transmitter then uses a public

key encryption technique to encrypt the message using the Public Key of the subscribers in S
to obtain | S | different cipher-texts.

These cipher-texts are broadcasted, and only the

subscribers in S are able to retrieve the message from the broadcast signal. However, this
scheme proves to be inefficient as a significant amount of bandwidth is expended by the
broadcast signal. If BW is the average bandwidth needed to broadcast a cipher-text, the
bandwidth needed to transmit the broadcast signal for S under this scheme is approximately
| S | *BW . So, usually a BE scheme is preferred since it provides only one cipher-text for a

given message and S , thus conserving bandwidth. Table 3.1 describes the notations used in
this type of scheme.
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Table 3.1 Notations Used in a BE Scheme
i, A, B ….
||

Node IDS
Concatenation of fields

KSD

Shared symmetric key between S and D derived by the noninteractive key agreement scheme

h()

Cryptographic hash function (say SHA-1)

hi()

Repeated application of hash function h(), i times

h(M,K)

Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC) for a message M
using the secret K

NA

Set of one-hop neighbors of A in the reliable delivery neighborhood
of A

KA

Secret provided by node A to all its one-hop neighbors

TA

Secret chosen by A that is explicitly protected from all one-hop
neighbors

K(M)
(TA)

Symmetric encryption of a message M using a key K
Broadcast secret TA encrypted with node A’s key with index i

The strategy behind most probabilistic key pre-distribution schemes is to allocate a
subset of keys to each node in the network from a pool of keys that are chosen by the KDC.
The scheme being used here successively hashes KDC’s secrets to obtain a subset of
allocated secrets. In this scheme, the KDC chooses a set of P keys, S = {K1,…..,KP}; two
public random functions, F() and f(); and a cryptographic hash function, h(). A device with
ID A is assigned k indexes, which are determined by
F(A) = {A1,A2,…..,Ak}, 1 ≤ Ai ≤ P, Ai ≠Aj ∀ i ≠ j .
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(3.9)

Corresponding to the public indices, device A is provided with secrets [since F() and
f() are public, anyone can evaluate F(A) to determine the indexes of secrets with device A].
Each index assigned to a device is also associated with a hash depth, ai = f(A,Ai), 1 ≤ i ≤ k, 1
≤ ai ≤ L∀ i, that is uniformly distributed between 1 and L.
The function F() is a uniform random generator that takes the total number of keys, P,
and the ID of the node as a seed and generates a set of k uniformly distributed indices
randomly selected from the pool of keys that are denoted by P. Similarly, the function f()
takes the node ID and index generated from F() and generates a hash depth for the
corresponding node ID with a particular index. The hash depths for a particular node are also
uniformly distributed between 1 and L. In addition, for a particular index, the KDC makes
sure that the hash depths are uniformly distributed between 1 and L across different nodes to
facilitate the revoking of nodes [12].
Functions F() and f() are outlined as follows:
function F():
Description: This algorithm will generate a required number of uniformly distributed
random numbers within a given range with the node’s identity as a seed.
Input: Total number of keys P and node ID as the seed
Output: k uniformly distributed unique indices randomly selected from the range 1 to
P
1. i = 1
2. while (i <= k)
a. x = rand(i) // random number generator between 1 and P
b. if x is not already in the list
i. IDi = x // ID  node identification, i  key index
ii. i++
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function f():
Description: This algorithm will generate random hash depths of a node for different
indices that are uniformly distributed within the range specified by the maximum
hash depth.
Input: Total number of keys P; maximum hash depth L; node ID; and indices of that
node represented by IDi.
Output: Uniformly distributed unique hash depths within the range 1 to L
for i = 1,….., k
hd_IDi = rand(L)
// hash depth of a node ID with index i
// is a random number generated between 1 and L

If a node C wants to revoke nodes A and B, it will identify the indices of the keys that
it possesses. Next, node C will search for the index to which neither A nor B have any
corresponding keys, and if it finds such an index, it will use the key with that index to
encrypt the broadcast message. This is a simple solution to the problem.
If the above condition is not met, node C will adopt the following approach. For
every index, a safe hash depth is computed. Any node that has a key with a particular index
can hash its key to this safe hash depth. So, node C will find the index with the safe hash
depth to revoke nodes A and B. Node C will then use the key with the selected index hashed
to the safe hash depth and encrypt the broadcast message with it.
When a node D, which is a two-hop neighbor of node C, receives the broadcast, it
will find the index of the key(s) sent by node C and use the corresponding key hashed to the
safe hash depth for that particular index to decrypt the broadcast message and attain access to
the broadcast secret.

36

Algorithm for the sender selecting a key to encrypt:
Description: The following algorithm will take a list of nodes to be revoked and
select the suitable keys for encrypting the broadcast keys to prevent the revoked
nodes from having access.
Input: List of indices IDi; 1 ≤ i ≤ k, corresponding hash depths hd_IDi; 1 ≤ i ≤ k, of
the nodes to be revoked r1, r2,….,rn.
Output: Key(s) with index and safe hash depth for encryption by the sender S,
1. Sender S will compute the safe hash depth for each index it has, di for i =
1 to k.
2. For i = 1 to k,
a. If there is an index i such that none of the keys
of the revoked
nodes exist,
i.
Sender S will select such key
and hash it di times,
resulting in
being used for encryption.
b. Or if the safe hash depth of a particular index, di <
where i ∊ 1
to k
i.
Sender S will select such key
and hash it di times,
resulting in
being used for encryption.

Algorithm for the receiver selecting a key to decrypt:
Description: The following algorithm will take key(s) from the sender and the
encrypted message, select the right key, and decrypt the message to gain access to the
broadcast secret.
Input: List of indices IDi; 1 ≤ i ≤ k, corresponding hash depths hd_IDi; 1 ≤ i ≤ k, of
the nodes that are revoked r1, r2,…, rn.
Index(s) of the key(s) used by the sender S and the message encrypted using the keys
Output: The decrypted broadcast from the sender S and access to the broadcast secret
TS.
1. The receiver will find the accessible key indexes from the list of keys sent
by the sender.
2. A method of trying keys with each index until decryption is successful
will be identify the index of the key used by the sender.
3. The identified key

will be used to decrypt the broadcast message and

attain access to the broadcast secret TS.
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The k secrets that are assigned to device A are
(3.10)
where

( ) = h(h(…j times(Kl)…)) represents the result of applying j successive hashes on

the value Kl using the cryptographic hash function h().

K iA represents node A’s key at index

d
i. Note that any entity with key K can determine x K for x ≥ d but not for x < d, where x

and d are the hash depths. Anyone can determine the indexes and hash depths of secrets
assigned to any device. One of the main advantages of probabilistic key pre-distribution
schemes is that they cater to the use of BE by any source. The KDC can authorize any
source (ф) to perform BE by providing it with encryption secrets:
Sф = {j

=

(

| ф)}, 1 ≤ i ≤ P, 1 ≤ j ≤ L

(3.11)

These encryption secrets do not reveal any information about the KDC’s secrets or
the decryption secrets as long as the hash function is pre-image resistant. For example, if a
node A chooses a broadcast secret TA and its r one-hop neighbors (R1,….,Rr) are revoked
from accessing the secret, the secret that is chosen by A is encrypted with k secrets that are
chosen from a set of P secrets. The node would then construct the BE message to be sent to
the list of one-hop neighbors denoted by NA as follows:
BA = [A||NA|| {

(TA), 1 ≤ i ≤ k} ||

],

(3.12)

where
= h(A,NA,{

(TA), 1 ≤ i ≤ k}, TA) .

(3.13)

These one-hop neighbors would not be able to access the BE message since they have
been revoked and, thus, would merely relay the BE message to their respective one-hop
neighbors.
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Any two-hop neighbor of node A, upon receiving the message, BA, can determine the
indices of each of the n secrets used by node A. In addition, any two-hop neighbor can
decrypt TA and verify that none of its one-hop neighbors had access to TA, which confirms
that the broadcast packet was not modified.
3.3

Non-Interactive Key Agreement Scheme
Bilinear pairings—or pairings, for short—were first used in the context of

cryptanalysis, but their pioneer use in cryptosystems can be credited to the works of Sakai et
al. [5]. In the discussion that follows, let E/Fq be an elliptic curve over a finite field Fq, E(Fq)
be the group of points of this curve, and #E(Fq) be the group order.
For the bilinear pairing, let n be a positive integer, G be an additively written group
of order n with identity O , and GT be a multiplicatively-written group of order n with
identity 1. A bilinear pairing is a computable, non-degenerate function, as shown below:
e : G  G  GT

(3.14)

The most important property of pairings in cryptographic constructions is the bilinearity, namely
P, Q  G, and a, b  Z * ,

(3.15)

e(aP, bQ)  e( P, bQ) a  e(aP, Q) b  e( P, Q) ab .

(3.16)

so that we have

In practice, group G is implemented using a group of points on certain elliptic curves while
group GT is implemented using a multiplicative subgroup of a finite extension field. Here
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we are using Type 1 pairings (in the sense of Galbraith, Paterson, and Smart [8]), resulting in
the additional property of
e(aP, Q)  (Q, P) .

(3.17)

In addition, pairings of Type 1 permit strings to be hashed to a specific group. The two
aforementioned properties are required for the efficient and simple implementation of the
non-interactive key agreement scheme [4].
One of the most basic problems in cryptography is the key distribution of the
frequently changing random keys that are used in algorithms based on symmetric encryption
to protect the integrity of the communication. An example of such a situation is when two
parties, X and Y, want to compute a shared key KXY with which to encrypt the data transfer.
Sakai et al. [5] proposed an identity-based non-interactive key agreement scheme
founded on bilinear pairings. In such a scheme, each node receives a unique ID and a secret
that is not shared with any other node. Two such nodes use another node’s ID and derive a
mutual secret without ever communicating. This mutual secret, unknown to any other nodes,
can be used to generate a cryptographic key for secure communication between the nodes
under consideration. A Trusted Authority (TA) is responsible for generating unique secret
from the IDs of the nodes and its own master secret. The TA should also generate the public
and private keys and distribute them among the nodes. To this end, it first generates a MSK
s, which is then used to generate the private keys of each node. In order to accomplish this,
the TA maps the identity of each node to a point on the elliptic curve through a hash and map
function ф.
Let us consider a node X, the public key for which is PX = ф(idx) while the private
key is SX = sPX. Node X is then preloaded with its ID (idx), private key SX, and the function
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ф. Node X can use Y’s ID (idy) to compute the public key of a node Y and to obtain PY =
ф(idy). The secret key of any node is known only to that node and the TA, such as when two
nodes A and B want to generate a mutual secret for secure communication and they happen to
know each other’s IDs. The private keys of both nodes are SA = sPA and SB = sPB. Both A
and B can compute the public keys of their counterparts using the function ф. According to
the bi-linearity property,
ě(SA,PB) = ě(sPA,PB) ,

(3.18)

= ě(PA,PB)s ,

(3.19)

= ě(PA,sPB) ,

(3.20)

= ě(PA,SB) ,

(3.21)

= ě(SB,PA) .

(3.22)

and

The secret key computed by the nodes is
kAB = ě(SA,PB) = ě(SB,PA) .

(3.23)

At this point, a suitable session key is derived through the appropriate use of a key
derivation function in which
KAB = KDF(key_length,kAB,session_param) ,

(3.24)

KDF = Key Derivation Function (say SHA-1, SHA-2) ,

(3.25)

key_length = length of the key to be generated ,

(3.26)

session_param = sequence number || time-to-live || target address .

(3.27)

where

and
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The key derivation uses the secret key and session dependent information, such as
sequence number/time-to-live, to protect the PREP mutable fields from a modification attack
by an intermediate node.
3.4

Key Distribution to Mesh Stations
The goal of this key distribution scheme is to selectively distribute and revoke the

keys to mesh stations in a WMN with minimum computations by employing key sharing
among the mesh stations that rely on probability. A simple shared-key discovery protocol is
used for the distribution and revocation of the keys as well as the node re-keying process.
The memory storage requirement for the keys of this process is within a few hundred keys.
In spite of the low memory storage requirement, when compared to several pair-wise privatekey sharing mechanisms, this scheme has almost similar security properties.
Before deploying the WMN, a set of keys is delivered to each mesh station. This key
set consists of k keys that are randomly chosen from a large pool of P keys. It is likely that a
pair of mesh stations may not have a shared key between them because of the random
distribution of the keys in the key set. However, if the pair of mesh stations that do not have
a shared key happen to have a path of other mesh stations between them that share keys pairwise at the network initialization stage, then that particular path can be used by the pair of
mesh stations to exchange a shared key. This eliminates the necessity of having a pair-wise
private key-sharing mechanism that assures complete connectivity between mesh stations
using shared keys. For a network with 10,000 mesh stations, it is necessary to pre-distribute,
to every mesh station, a key set with only 250 keys, which are randomly chosen from a pool
of 100,000 keys to ensure complete connectivity of mesh stations using shared keys. This
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allows the possibility of the expansion of WMNs because of the availability of a substantial
number of keys.
The key distribution is divided into three phases: the pre-distribution of keys, the
discovery of shared keys, and the establishment of path keys. In the key pre-distribution
phase, a large of pool of keys (P) is generated along with their corresponding key identifiers.
From the pool of P keys, k keys are randomly chosen without replacements and are placed in
the key set of each mesh station. The key identifiers for each key set along with the mesh
station identification information are saved on a trusted station. The trusted station is also
loaded with the key that is shared with each mesh station.
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CHAPTER 4

PROPOSED SECURITY FRAMEWORK FOR HWMP

In this chapter, a security framework for HWMP is proposed. First, extension fields
on routing messages are presented followed by explanations for protecting both the mutable
and non-mutable fields of the routing messages. Then, the proposed protocols in the path
discovery phase and the path maintenance phase are described.

4.1

Security Requirement
External attacks are launched by intruders who are not authorized users of the

network. For example, an intruding node may eavesdrop on the packets and replay those
packets later to gain access to the network’s resources. Implementing security services, such
as SAE and 802.1x authentication protocols, can prevent external attacks in WMNs. These
services generate authenticated keys with which to authenticate frames. The integrity of the
contents of the frame can be protected by including a message integrity code while the
confidentiality can be protected by encrypting the frames with algorithms such as the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Only link-to-link based security services are required
to keep the external attacks at bay.
44

However, WMNs need to be protected from internal attacks, which is a challenging
task. Path diversion and impersonation attacks are general examples of internal attacks in
which malicious nodes can exploit the routing protocol, such as HWMP, to create a path
diversion into a black hole or pose as the root mesh station and eavesdrop on the packets
being sent by other mesh stations to attain route discovery.
In order to protect the nodes from internal attacks, such as modification of fields like
the hop count and air-time metrics, an efficient security service is needed to detect illegal
modifications to the mutable fields in the frames. End-to-end security schemes may prevent
the modification of non-mutable fields by intermediate nodes, but they do not protect the
modification of mutable fields by malicious intermediate nodes. Therefore, link-to-link
security is needed to address the vulnerability of mutable fields to modification so that a
receiver can verify that attackers have not modified the sender’s frame.

The security

requirements of WMNs and the compliance of the proposed security framework to those
requirements are discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
4.2

Proposed Security Framework
To address the security concerns discussed in the previous section, the following

security framework is proposed. This framework is divided into two parts: 1) addressing the
security of the non-mutable fields and 2) addressing the security of mutable fields. Nonmutable fields of the HWMP frame remain constant from the source node to the destination
node in a WMN. To authenticate the non-mutable fields, the ID-based signature scheme is
used because the signer does not need to have a signed public-key certificate to be verified by
other entities. Here, the user’s public key is computed from its identification information,
such as its MAC address or e-mail, and a corresponding private key is computed from a
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MSK by a PKG. In ID-based signature verification, the identity and message-signature pair
is provided to the algorithm.

The elimination of certificates results in reduced

communication overhead and computation cost.
For safeguarding the mutable fields of HWMP frames, we consider different schemes
for path request and path reply messages. In order to prevent node deletion attacks by
malicious nodes that deliberately shorten the paths, a two-hop authentication can be used.
However, considering a route Y→W→X→Z, a malicious node X in the network might rebroadcast a PREQ message coming from its two-hop neighbor Y through the node W without
incrementing the hop count, thus, falsely portraying to the next node Z that Y is a one-hop
neighbor of X. To avoid this, Z must know the one-hop neighbors of X to ensure that Y is not
a one-hop neighbor of X. Also, two-hop authentication demands substantial overhead as it
requires the nodes to maintain a group secret with their corresponding two-hop neighbors.
Therefore, an efficient scheme is required that can detect the modifications by non-colluding
malicious nodes and, at the same time, provide two-hop authentication with only the
available one-hop neighborhood information. A widely used technique in controlling user
access to digital content as per digital rights management known as BE can address the issue
as discussed above.
To protect the mutable fields in the PREP frames from replay attacks, the noninteractive key agreement scheme [5] is used. The very nature of the scheme does not involve
any interaction between two participating mesh stations; therefore, no exchange of frames
occurs between them. Instead, each mesh station will compute the mutual agreement key on
its own, without requiring any information from the other station.
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For the PREQ phase, an MSBE scheme using probabilistic key distribution is
considered, which allows multiple sources to broadcast secrets without the use of asymmetric
cryptographic primitives.

BE provides a means of establishing shared secrets between

privileged nodes in a set of nodes while the remaining nodes are not provided with the secret
and are referred to as revoked nodes. The strategy behind most probabilistic key predistribution schemes is to allocate a subset of keys to each node in the network from a pool of
keys that are chosen by the KDC.
For the PREP phase, the destination already knows the route back to the source and,
thus, does not have to broadcast the PREP frame. Instead, the destination would unicast the
frame to the source through the intermediate nodes. Since no broadcasting is involved here,
the usage of BE is unnecessary. In order to authenticate the mutable fields in the path reply
frame, an ID-based non-interactive key agreement is employed, which requires only the
identity information of the mesh nodes to encrypt the communications. In this scheme, no
extra public key data is needed and no interaction is required between the nodes to derive the
mutual key. Moreover, in the PREP phase, the intermediate nodes do not broadcast the
frames in which a one-hop group key is used to secure the frame. Therefore, the scope exists
for using a scheme in which minimum keys are utilized for authentication. This is the
reasoning for using a non-interactive key agreement scheme, as it greatly reduces the
computation time and storage of keys in a mesh station because the two communication
nodes do not interact. This is a great advantage for resource-constrained environments such
as the WMN. Each node is assumed to have a unique ID and a unique secret that is not
shared with any other node. Two nodes that wish to authenticate each other would use this
secret to derive a mutual key to encrypt the communication. It is also assumed that a TA is
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responsible for generating and distributing the unique secrets, derived from node IDs, as well
as a master secret possessed by the TA to the nodes. The derived mutual key is unknown to
any other node besides the ones participating in the authentication. This can be a significant
advantage to WMNs as it prevents a node from storing a large number of mutual keys.
4.3

Protocol Description
The most important security feature of a path discovery process involves the use of

cryptographic methods as well as authentication of the frame’s non-mutable and mutable
fields. This is accomplished through the addition of message extension fields to the HWMP
path selection frame elements, such as the PREQ, PREP, GANN, RANN, and PERR.
4.3.1

Proposed Message Extension Fields

This section describes the message extension fields of the HWMP frames used in the
proposed scheme.
Path Request Message Extension
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
Type
|
Length
| Reserved
|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
PNM
|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
Top Hash
|
...
...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
Hash
|
...
...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
Signature
|
...
...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
HMAC
|
...
...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

Type

1

Length

The length of type-specific data, not including the Type
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and Length fields
Reserved

Reserved for future use

PNM
Top Hash

This indicates the metric of the node at the previous hop.
The top hash for the hop-count authentication. This is the
result of hashing an initial value ‘n’ times, where ‘n’ is
the maximum hop count.

Hash

This is the hashed value that corresponds to the actual hop count of the
current node under consideration.

Signature

This is the signature of the non-mutable fields of the HWMP frame
that is obtained by using an ID-based signature scheme. The three bits
of this signature, in addition to the sixty bytes, denote that only the xcoordinates of the points on an elliptic curve are used. The ID-based
signature scheme is based on ECC.

HMAC

This is the HMAC generated by using the MSBE scheme.

Path Reply Message Extension
0
1
2
3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
Type
|
Length
| Reserved
|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
PNM
|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
Top Hash
|
...
...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
Hash
|
...
...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
Signature
|
...
...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
HMAC
|
...
...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

Type

2

Length

The length of type-specific data, not including the Type
and Length fields

Reserved

Reserved for future use
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PNM

This indicates the metric of the node at the previous hop.

Top Hash

The top hash for the hop-count authentication. This is the
result of hashing an initial value ‘n’ times, where ‘n’ is
the maximum hop count.

Hash

This is the hashed value corresponding to the actual hop count of the
current node under consideration.

Signature

This is the signature of the non-mutable fields of the HWMP frame
that is obtained by using an ID-based signature scheme. The three bits
of this signature, in addition to the sixty bytes, denote that only the xcoordinates of the points on an elliptic curve are used. The ID-based
signature scheme is based on ECC.

HMAC

This is the HMAC generated by using the MSBE scheme.

Path Error Message Extension
0
1
2
3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
Type
|
Length
|
Reserved
|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
Signature
|
...
...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
HMAC
|
...
...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

Type

3

Length

The length of type-specific data, not including the Type
and Length fields

Reserved

Reserved for future use

Signature

This is the signature of the non-mutable fields of the HWMP frame
that is obtained by using an ID-based signature scheme. The three bits
of this signature, in addition to the sixty bytes, denote that only the xcoordinates of the points on an elliptic curve are used. The ID-based
signature scheme is based on ECC.

HMAC

This is the HMAC generated by using the MSBE scheme.
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Root Announcement Message Extension
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
Type
|
Length
| Reserved
|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
PNM
|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
Top Hash
|
...
...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
Hash
|
...
...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
Signature
|
...
...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
HMAC
|
...
...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

Type

4

Length

The length of type-specific data, not including the Type
and Length fields

Reserved

Reserved for future use

PNM

This indicates the metric of the node at the previous hop.

Top Hash

The top hash for the hop-count authentication. This is the
result of hashing an initial value ‘n’ times, where ‘n’ is
the maximum hop count.

Hash

This is the hashed value corresponding to the actual hop count of the
current node under consideration.

Signature

This is the signature of the non-mutable fields of the HWMP frame
that is obtained by using an ID-based signature scheme. The three bits
of this signature, in addition to the sixty bytes, denote that only the xcoordinates of the points on an elliptic curve are used. The ID-based
signature scheme is based on ECC.

HMAC

This is the HMAC generated by using the MSBE scheme.
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Gate Announcement Message Extension
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
Type
|
Length
| Reserved
|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
Top Hash
|
...
...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
Hash
|
...
...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
Signature
|
...
...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
HMAC
|
...
...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

Type

5

Length

The length of type-specific data, not including the Type
and Length fields

Reserved

Reserved for future use

Top Hash

The top hash for the hop-count authentication. This is the
result of hashing an initial value ‘n’ times, where ‘n’ is
the maximum hop count.

Hash

This is the hashed value corresponding to the actual hop count of the
current node under consideration.

Signature

This is the signature of the non-mutable fields of the HWMP frame
that is obtained by using an ID-based signature scheme. The three bits
of this signature, in addition to the sixty bytes, denote that only the xcoordinates of the points on an elliptic curve are used. The ID-based
signature scheme is based on ECC.

HMAC

This is the HMAC generated by using the MSBE scheme.

4.3.2

Summary of Message Extension Fields
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By observing the flags field of the corresponding type of element, the mesh station
receiving the frame will be able to identify if the frame is accompanied by an extension. For
example, the PREQ element format has a flags field that is 8 bits long (B0:B7). Bits B3-B5
and B7 are reserved, in general, and can be used in this situation to notify the receiver of the
existence of an extension field to the incoming frame. Similarly, the PREP and PERR
elements have a flags field that reserves bits B0-B5 and B7, which can be used for the same
purpose as mentioned above. Also, RANN and GANN elements reserve bits B1 through B7
and B0 through B7, respectively, which can be used to notify the message extension field.
Table 4.1 lists the message extension fields proposed in this dissertation.
PREQ, PREP, and RANN message extensions have the same format described
earlier. The PERR message extension is the same as the PREQ message extension except
that the PNM, Top Hash, and Hash fields are not required. The GANN message extension is
the same as the PREQ message extension except that the PNM is not required.

53

Table 4.1 Extension Fields
Name

Length (in bytes)

Type

1

Length

1

Description
1 – PREQ
2 – PREP
3 – PERR
4 – RANN
5 – GANN
The length of type-specific data, not including the Type
and Length fields

Reserved 2

For future use

Top
Hash

20

The top hash for the hop-count authentication

PNM

4

Previous Node Metric

Hash

20

The hash corresponding to the actual hop count

HMAC

20

HMAC for mutable fields using MSBE

NMF
Sign

60 + 3bits

The signature for non-mutable fields using an ID-based
scheme

4.3.3

Non-Mutable Field Protection
The following are the non-mutable fields of the PREQ frame that are used for the

route discovery process by mesh stations:










Element ID
Length
Flags
Hop Count
Element TTL
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Path Discovery ID
Originator Mesh Station Address
Originator HWMP Sequence
Number
Originator External Address









Lifetime
Metric
Target Count
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Per Target Flags
Target Address
Target Sequence Number

These fields should be provided with end-to-end security from a source node to a
destination node to prevent illegal modification by intermediate nodes. In this case, end-toend security is sufficient because these fields do not change from hop-to-hop; therefore, this
offline/online signature scheme can be used to sign these fields by the source node requesting
the route and can be verified by the destination node to ensure the integrity of the nonmutable fields.
Using an ID-based offline/online signature scheme can detect illegal modification of
the non-mutable fields of HWMP frames by malicious intermediate nodes, thus avoiding
potential internal attacks. Therefore, this scheme provides integrity assurance of the nonmutable fields against the source node of any intermediate nodes on the transmission path to
protect NMF modification attacks. The usage of an ID-based setting eliminates the need to
attach a certificate to the signature for verification purposes. In addition, online/offline
signature generation significantly reduces the computation cost and storage requirement
involved in generating signatures. In this case, the signature generation process involves two
phases.
4.3.4

Mutable Field Protection
The proposed approach for securing mutable fields in the route discovery process

uses symmetric cryptographic primitives. Usually BE schemes are assumed to perform
single source broadcasting to multiple receivers. However, the proposed approach applies a
BE technique that has been adapted to support multiple sources, thus making it a good
candidate for the HWMP protocol. An offline KDC is assumed to have distributed secrets to
every node for establishing, between nodes, pairwise secrets. It is also assumed that the
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KDC has distributed, to every node, authentication and verification methods of a MSBE
scheme.
The source node uses a Group Temporal Key (GTK) as the one-hop group secret
(Ks), encrypts it with its PMK that is generated by the SAE authentication protocol [7], and
delivers it to its one-hop neighbors. SAE is a peer-to-peer mutual authentication protocol
that assumes that the nodes in the network already possess a pre-shared common password.
A PMK generated by this protocol is shared between any given two nodes that are trying to
authenticate and is used to encrypt the secret randomly selected by the nodes (say KS). The
source node also provides a BE message (BS), which includes its encrypted broadcast secret
TS. The access of all one-hop neighbors of the source to the broadcast secret is revoked.
One-hop neighbors of the source are expected to relay the BE message that they receive to
their one-hop neighbors. The two-hop neighbors of the source will be able to verify the
integrity of the received BS with the pre-distributed broadcast keys possessed already. This
scheme ensures that a node securely recognizes its two-hop neighbors without having to trust
one-hop neighbors. Any two-hop neighbor of the source that receives BS will be able to
extract TS and verify that the previous node from which it received BS did not have access to
TS. By verifying the HMAC in the BE message, it can confirm the integrity of the message
as well. The next two sections explain how to use the extended fields in both path discovery
and path maintenance.
4.4

Path Discovery
Path discovery has two phases: the path request phase and the path reply phase.
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4.4.1 Path Request Phase
In the following scenario, assume that a source node S generates a PREQ frame to
find a route to the destination node D through nodes A, B, and C (S→A→B→C→D), as
shown in Figure 4.1. S randomly selects an initial hash value, hash, and hashes it hc times to
get shc = hhc(hash). The non-mutable fields of the PREQ generated by the source node are
signed using an online/offline ID-based signature scheme and are embedded in the PREQ, as
shown below. Since the non-mutable fields do not change at every hop, intermediate node
authentication is not necessary; therefore, the source node signs the non-mutable fields of the
HWMP PREQ frame, including the addresses and sequence numbers of the originator and
targets, lifetime, flags, PREQ ID, Element ID, length and target count. This signature is then
embedded in the HWMP message extension for the PREQ and broadcasted.

S

A

B

C

D

Figure 4.1 PREQ flow

Source S originates and then broadcasts a route request, as shown in Figure 4.2,
which will be received by its one-hop neighbors. Note that the following message format
only represents the HWMP message extension fields. These extension fields are attached to
the standard HWMP frames and are transmitted during the route discovery process.
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S*:[Ks(preq||NMF_Sign||hc||shc||hcS||mS||pnmS||s0||M0||BS)]
preq : PREQ original message fields including both mutable fields and
non-mutable fields
preq = Element ID||Length||Flags||PREQ ID||Originator
Address||Originator Sequence Number ||Destination Address|| Destination
Sequence Number
NMF_Sign = signature of the non-mutable fields of S
hc = maximum hop count
shc = random value 'hash’ hashed hc times
hcS = hop count at node S
mS = airtime metric at node S
pnmS = previous node metric at node S (0 for source node)
KSD = shared symmetric key between S and D
TS = secret chosen by S that is explicitly protected from all one-hop
neighbors of S
s0 = h((hc||shc),KSD)
s1 = h(s0)
M0 = h(({hc||shc},hcS,mS,pnmS,s1),TS)
Bs = BE message

Figure 4.2 Route request from Source S

The shared symmetric keys are generated by using an ID-based non-interactive key
agreement scheme [5]. The one-hop neighbors of S will be able to decrypt the PREQ using
the key KS that was shared by S earlier. As shown in Figure 4.3, a neighbor node A decrypts
the PREQ by S, increments the hop count, updates the metric and previous node metric, and
re-broadcasts the PREQ through encryption using its one-hop secret key KA, which it had
shared with its one-hop neighbors as well. The previous node metric was pnmA = mS.
Notably, node A does not have access to S’s broadcast secret TS.
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A*:[KA(preq||NMF_Sign||hc||shc||hcA||mA||pnmA||s1||M0||S||M1)]
M1 = h(({hc||shc},hcA,mA,pnmA,s2),TA)
s2 = h(s1)
pnmA = mS

Figure 4.3 PREQ broadcasted by node A

At the next hop, node B decrypts the message broadcasted by A using the one-hop
secret shared by A. Node B, as the two-hop neighbor of S, can have access to M0 as per the
BE scheme.
B can confirm the integrity of the PREQ and the validity of s1 = h(s0) as well as verify
that node A did not modify the hop count, metric, and previous node metric. The pnmA that
node B receives in M0 should be equal to the mS to ensure that node A did not modify the
metric mS. After successful verification, M0 is stripped off by B and updated with M2 for
downstream verification, as seen in Figures 4.4 and 4.5.

B*:[KB(preq||NMF_Sign||hc||shc||hcB||mB||pnmB||s2||M1||A||M2)]
M2 = h(({hc||shc},hcB,mB,pnmB,s3),TB)
s3 = h(s2)
pnmB = mA

Figure 4.4 PREQ broadcasted by node B
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C*:[KC(preq||NMF_Sign||hc||shc||hcC||mC||pnmC||s3||M2||B||M3)]
M3 = h(({hc||shc},hcC,mC,pnmC,s4),TC)
s4 = h(s3)
pnmC = mB

Figure 4.5 PREQ broadcasted by node C

Intermediate nodes include the previous hop identity in the frame they are
broadcasting so that the next hop can verify two-hop authentication. By doing so, the
intermediate nodes will be able to cache the information about the two predecessor nodes
indicated in the PREQ. Whenever a destination node receives a PREQ, the integrity of the
hop count is verified through the following process:
The hash function h() is applied as the maximum hop count minus the number
of hops it took for the PREQ to reach the destination (say j) times the value in
the most recent hash field value. The resulting value should be equal to the
value in the shc field:
(sj)≟ shc

(4.1)

When the PREQ reaches destination node D within these four hops, the destination
verifies that s4 is consistent with the commitment shc signed by the source and the hop count
indicated in the PREQ, i.e., the destination node will verify
destination node verifies the non-mutable fields’ signature.

4.4.2 Path Reply Phase
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(s3)≟ shc. Also, the

For the PREP phase, HMAC can be used to distribute pairwise transient keys among
the mesh stations. The MAC will be applied to mutable fields, such as the metric, hop count,
and the previous node metric (PNM). It should be verified that PNM is greater than the
metric at all times.
Each node receives a unique ID and a secret that is not shared with any other node.
Two such nodes use another node’s ID and derive a mutual secret without even
communicating. This mutual secret, unknown to any other nodes, can be used to generate a
cryptographic key for secure communication between the nodes under consideration. Such a
scheme is referred to as an ID-based non-interactive key distribution scheme [5]. The TA is
responsible for generating a unique secret from the IDs of the nodes and its own master
secret. The TA should generate the public and private keys and distribute them among the
nodes. To this end, the TA first generates an MSK s, which is then used to generate the
private keys of each node. In order to accomplish this, the TA maps the identity of each node
to a point on an elliptic curve through a hash and map function ф.
Let us consider a node X for which the public key is PX = ф(idx) and the private key is
SX = sPX. Node X is then preloaded with its ID (idx), private key SX, and the function ф.
Node X can compute the public key of a node Y by using Y’s ID (idy) to get PY = ф(idy). The
secret key of any node is known only to that node and the TA. For example, two nodes A
and B want to generate a mutual secret for secure communication, and they happen to know
each other’s IDs. The private keys of both nodes are SA = sPA and SB = sPB. Both A and B
can compute the public keys of their counterparts using the function ф. According to the bilinearity property, the secret key computed by the nodes is
kAB = ě(SA,PB) = ě(SB,PA) .
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(4.2)

Through the appropriate use of a key derivation function that takes the secret key computed
above and the session dependent information, such as the sequence number/time-to-live, a
suitable session key is derived to protect the PREP mutable fields from a modification attack
by intermediate nodes, which can be seen in Figure 4.6.

KAB = KDF(key_length,kAB,session_param)
KDF = Key Derivation Function (such as SHA-1, SHA-2)
key_length = length of the key to be generated
session_param = sequence number || time-to-live || target address

Figure 4.6 Session key derivation

Consider the same scenario as discussed above in which a source node S has
broadcasted a PREQ to find a path to the destination node D. Now that the destination node
has received the PREQ and is aware of the path to the source, it does not have to broadcast a
PREP. The destination node would instead construct a PREP frame and unicast it in reverse
to the intermediate node (Figures 4.8 and 4.9) and then back through nodes B and A (Figure
4.10). The reverse flow of this PREP is made clear in Figure 4.7.

S

A

B
Figure 4.7 PREP flow
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C

D

DC : [KD(prep||NMF_Sign||h’c||dh’c||hcD||mD||pnmD||d0||MDB)]
d0

=

h((h’c||dh’c),KSD)

MDB = h(({h’c||dh’c},hcD,mD,pnmD,d1),KDB)
d1 = h(d0)
h’c = hop count as indicated in PREQ from source
dh’c = random value ‘hash’ hashed h’c times
hcD = hop count at node D
mD = airtime metric at node D
pnmD = pnm at node D which is ‘0’
KSD = shared symmetric key between S and D
KDB = mutual key derived by nodes D and B
NMF_Sign = signature of the non-mutable fields of D
prep = Element ID||Length||Flags||Originator Address||Originator
Sequence Number ||Destination Address|| Destination Sequence Number

Figure 4.8 PREP frames unicasted by node D along the reverse path

CB : [KC(prep||NMF_Sign||h’c||dh’c||hcC||mC||pnmC||d1||MCA)]
MCA = h(({h’c||dh’c},hcC,mC,pnmC,d2),KCA)
d2 = h(d1)

Figure 4.9 PREP frames unicasted by node C along the reverse path
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BA : [KB(prep||NMF_Sign||h’c||dh’c||hcB||mB||pnmB||d2||MBS)]
MBS = h(({h’c||dh’c},hcB,mB,pnmB,d3),KBS)
d3 = h(d2)

Figure 4.10 PREP frames unicasted by node B along the reverse path

Noticeably, the PREP frames are efficiently authenticated en route to the source node
that generated the PREQ. These PREP frames are encrypted in transit with the one-hop
group secret that is shared by the one-hop neighbors of a node and authenticated using
HMAC to ensure two-hop authentication.
In case an intermediate node already has a route to the destination from a previous
encounter with a PREQ or PREP from the destination, the intermediate node can generate a
PREP to be unicasted to the source if 1) the Destination Only (DO) flag is not set in the
PREQ frame and 2) the last known sequence number of the destination in the PREQ that it
just received is lower than the sequence number of the destination that the intermediate mesh
station possesses in its route cache. In the example scenario discussed above in which source
node S is trying to find a route to destination node D, if node C already has a route to node D
and if the DO flag in the PREQ from S is not set, C can generate a PREP through the process
depicted in Figure 4.11.
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Figure 4.11 Intermediate node reply (DO flag is not set)

In the process shown above, the source node S sends a PREQSD in an attempt to find a
route to the destination node D. In this scenario, node C already knows the route to D
through a PREPDI, which node D generated in response to a PREQID from node I, produced
in an attempt to find a route to node D. Node C contains the following information gathered
from the PREPDI from node D:


The route to node D, which is C→E→F→D



prep - Element ID || Length || Flags || Originator Address || Originator Sequence
Number || Destination Address || Destination Sequence Number



NMF_Sign: signature of the non-mutable fields of the PREP from D to I



h’c – the number of hops from node I to node D



dh’c – random ‘hash’ value hashed h’c times



hcE – hop count at node E



mE – metric at node E



pnmE – previous node’s metric of E (mF)



d2 – h(d1)



MFC = h(({h’c || dh’c}, hcF, mF, pnmF, d2), KFC)
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Node C will send a unicast PREQ to node E; after receiving this unicast, node E will
see that the intermediate node special flag is set. This special flag will invoke node E to
search its cache for a route to node D through its previous encounters of the PREQ/PREP
involving node D. In this scenario, node C will then send a special PREQ to node E with its
hop count, metric, and previous node metric and other information, as shown below, from the
PREPDI sent from node D to node I, which it has stored in its cache. This process is reflected
in Figure 4.12.

CE:[KC(preq||NMF_Sign||hc||shc||hcC||mC||pnmC||s3||M2||B||M3||iFlag)]
M3 = h(({hc||shc},hcC,mC,pnmC,s4),TC)
s4 = h(s3)
pnmC = mB
iFlag = intermediate node flag set by node C. This flag will let node E
know that C is sending this particular PREQ to authenticate the
intermediate nodes on the way back to source node S. The reserved flag
in the PREQ frame format can be used for this purpose.

Figure 4.12 PREQ unicasted from node C to node E

Node E will receive this PREQ as any other PREQ and process it to verify its
authenticity. Node E will also observe that the special intermediate flag (iFlag) is set and,
therefore, prepare a suitable PREP and send it to node C, as shown in Figure 4.13.
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EC : [KE(prepE||h’c||dh’c||hcE||mE||pnmE||d2||MEB)]
MEB = h((prepE,{h’c||dh’c},hcE,mE,pnmE,d3),KEB)
d3 = h(d2)
prepE – S||D||seqD||seqS||prD
prD - PREQ or PREP that node E has encountered earlier and stored in its
cache

Figure 4.13 Special PREP sent from node C to node E

After receiving the PREP from node E, node C will forward it to node B via the
normal PREP propagation process, as shown in the Figure 4.14. Node B will be able to
verify if node C has modified the contents of the PREP from node E because B now has twohop authentication from node E. Ideally, this process of an intermediate node replying to a
PREQ is an extension of the normal PREP reply process, except that, in this case, the
intermediate nodes introduce an extra step for authentication and verification purposes.

CB : [KC(prepE||h’c||dh’c||hcC||mC||pnmC||d3||MCA)]
MCA = h((prepE,{h’c||dh’c},hcC,mC,pnmC,d4),KCA)
d4 = h(d3)

Figure 4.14 PREP forwarded from node C to node B
4.5

Path Maintenance
Path maintenance is done through the following three frames: path error, gate

announcement, and root announcement.
4.5.1 Path Error
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In the scenario depicted below in Figure 4.15, node B finds a broken link to node C.
It will generate a PERR frame to its precursor mesh station, which is node A in this case,
informing the station of the unreachability of node C through node B.
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Figure 4.15 PERR flow

Figure 4.16 shows the message extension field that node B attaches to its PERR frame
before being sent to node A. In this case, the non-mutable fields of the PERR element (such
as element ID, length, number of destinations, flags, destination address, HWMP sequence
number, destination external address, and reason code) are signed using an ID-based offlineonline signature scheme. The only MF in the PERR frame is the element TTL, which is
protected by encrypting the message extension field with a mutual shared key.
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BA : [KAB-PMK(perr||NMF_Sign||TTL)]
TTL = element TTL
KAB-PMK = PMK generated by SAE
NMF_Sign = signature of the non-mutable fields
perr = Element ID||Length||Flags||Number of destinations||Destination
Address|| HWMP Sequence Number || Destination External Address || Reason
Code

Figure 4.16 Message extension field of the PERR frame
4.5.2 Gate Announcement
When a mesh station is generating and sending a GANN frame that announces itself
as the mesh gate, the GANN is propagated in the network through a process that is similar to
that of the PREQ, including a similar frame flow although there is no set destination in the
GANN because it is an announcement to all mesh stations (see Figure 4.17).
In the following scenario, a mesh gate S generates a GANN frame to be propagated to
the network of mesh stations. This mesh gate attaches the message extension field depicted
in Figure 4.18 to its GANN in order to ensure the integrity of the frame. S randomly selects
an initial hash value hash and hashes it hc times to get shc = hhc(hash). The non-mutable
fields of the GANN that are generated by the source node are signed using an online/offline
ID-based signature scheme and are embedded in the GANN as shown below. Since the nonmutable fields do not change at every hop, intermediate node authentication is not necessary.
Thus, the source node signs the non-mutable fields of the HWMP GANN frame, such as the
gate address, sequence number, lifetime, flags, element ID, and length. This signature is then
embedded in the HWMP message extension for the GANN and broadcasted.
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Figure 4.17 GANN flow

S*:[Ks(gann||NMF_Sign||hc||shc||hcS||s0||M0 || BS)]
gann = Element ID||Length||Flags||Hop Count ||Element TTL||mesh gate
address||GANN Sequence Number||Interval
NMF_Sign = signature of the non-mutable fields of S
hc = element TTL (maximum hop count)
shc = random value 'hash’ hashed hc times
hcS = hop count at node S
TS = secret chosen by S that is explicitly protected from all one-hop
neighbors of S
s0 = h((hc||shc))
s1 = h(s0)
M0 = h(({hc||shc},hcS,s1),TS)
Bs = broadcast secret of S

Figure 4.18 Message extension field of the GANN

The one-hop neighbors of S will be able to decrypt the GANN using the key KS that was
shared by S earlier. As reflected in Figure 4.19, a neighboring node, A, will decrypt the
GANN broadcasted by S, increment the hop count, decrement the element TTL, and
broadcast it through encryption using its one-hop secret key KA that it shared with its one-hop
neighbors as well. Note that node A does not have access to S’s broadcast secret TS.
Propagation of the GANN frame to nodes B, C, and D proceeds in a similar fashion.

71

A*:[KA(preq||NMF_Sign||hc||shc||hcA||s1||M0||S||M1)]
M1 = h(({hc||shc},hcA,s2),TA)
s2 = h(s1)

Figure 4.19 Path of the GANN through node A

4.5.3 Root Announcement
The message flow of a RANN is comparable to that of a GANN except that the
mutable fields of the RANN in the message extension field include the metric and PNM.
The message extension field of the RANN is shown in Figure 4.20 for a scenario similar to
that discussed above for the GANN.

S*:[Ks(rann||NMF_Sign||hc||shc||hcS||mS||pnmS||s0||M0 || BS)]
rann = Element ID||Length||Flags||Hop Count ||Element TTL||root mesh
station address||HWMP Sequence Number||Interval||Metric
NMF_Sign = signature of the non-mutable fields of S
hc = maximum hop count
shc = random value 'hash’ hashed hc times
hcS = hop count at node S
mS = airtime metric at node S
pnmS = PNM at node S (0 for source node)
TS = secret chosen by S that is explicitly protected from all one-hop
neighbors of S
s0 = h((hc||shc))
s1 = h(s0)
M0 = h(({hc||shc},hcS,mS,pnmS,s1),TS)

Figure 4.20 Message extension field of the RANN
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CHAPTER 5

SECURITY ANALYSIS

This chapter will outline a security analysis of the scheme proposed in Chapter 4,
starting with a discussion of the general security requirements of the HWMP and the routing
protocol in WMNs according to the IEEE 802.11s standard.
5.1

Security Requirements of HWMP Frames
Five types of frames are involved in the HWMP routing mechanism, all of which

require specific security features for protection from both internal and external attacks,
depending on their functionality and scope. Table 5.1 outlines the different security service
requirements for the HWMP routing frames in WMNs.
Authentication here is defined as the assurance provided by a mesh station that it is
who it is claiming to be. In other words, the mesh station should be able to convince the
authenticating mesh station/gateway of its validity by providing correct identification, which
has been agreed upon in the beginning. Failing to do so will prevent the mesh station from
pairing up with the authenticating party, and no communication will be entertained by the
authenticating party. Integrity is the assurance provided to a mesh station that the data has
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not been altered without authorization, either intentionally or unintentionally.

In other

words, integrity is considered to be maintained if the fields of the routing frames in HWMP
are not altered illegally by any other intermediate nodes in the network.

Table 5.1Security requirements for HWMP routing frames

Essentially, a PREQ frame can be split into three major fields: HDR (header),
mutable fields, and non-mutable fields. The mesh station, which is trying to find a route to
another mesh station, broadcasts a PREQ to find the path to its destination. Therefore, each
of the three major fields in this frame requires authentication and integrity security services
for point-to-point communication. Point-to-point communication refers to the link between
two adjacent mesh stations that are only one hop away from each other. Every intermediate
node in the network will require authentication of the sender of the frame and assurance of
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the integrity of the contents of the frame. However, the non-mutable fields of the frame do
not change once the PREQ is originated from the source node. Therefore, in addition to
point-to-point authentication and integrity, the same authentication and integrity assurance is
required for end-to-end communication.

End-to-end communication refers to the link

between the source and the destination nodes wherein a destination node will be able to
verify the authentication and integrity of the PREQ frame. This will prevent the intermediate
mesh nodes from modifying the contents of the frame illegally.
Another security service that is required is point-to-point encryption of the mutable
and non-mutable fields of the PREQ frame. End-to-end encryption is not the best choice in
this case because the intermediate mesh stations must be able to access the information
because the mutable fields change at every hop. Therefore, a point-to-point encryption
scheme would be much more useful in encrypting the fields of the frame, thereby providing
security to the contents of the frame. However, a downside that must be considered is that
encryption involves expensive computations and may be reserved for situations in which the
level of security required for the network is high.
When HWMP is operating in a proactive mode, a mesh station can announce itself as
the root node via the PREQ/RANN frames. This could create a security concern because a
rogue node can send out an announcement claiming that it is the root node via the
PREQ/RANN frame. In order to overcome such problems, the use of a root permission level
is an extremely important security requirement in HWMP. This permission level is required
only for the non-mutable fields of the PREQ/RANN frames.

Identity-based signature

schemes can be used in this case to prevent the misuse of a root announcement in HWMP.
By using this type of scheme, a root permission level can be embedded as the input in
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addition to the MAC address of the mesh station. This will help the intermediate nodes to
verify if the RANN has originated from a real root node or not. This will also prevent the
misuse of the RANN by rogue nodes. However, it should be noted that using signature
schemes involves other considerations, such as key distribution techniques and the
computational overhead that is involved in the scheme.

Further, internal attackers can

completely forge the path metric because they have access to the required security keys to
authenticate the PREQ/RANN frame and can, therefore, forge fields such as the metric. Endto-end integrity verification would not be of much help either because the mutable fields are
updated at every hop along the way. Thus, this situation calls for a strong forgery detection
mechanism in HWMP to prevent intermediate mesh stations from broadcasting the
PREQ/RANN frames with forged fields.
A good example of such a mechanism can be explained using the following scenario.
When a mesh station sends a PREQ, it is heard by all of its one-hop neighbors, and it also
hears the frames transmitted by its neighbors. When a mesh station transmits a PREQ frame,
it should verify the frames that are propagated by its neighbors by comparing them with the
frame that it has transmitted. The metric value in the frames propagated by its neighbors
should always be greater than the path metric of the original frame. The application of such a
mechanism should be carefully designed, keeping in mind the computational overhead that it
might cause.
In a replay attack, the attacker snoops on the communication between mesh stations,
stores the frames, and later uses these frames to impersonate other mesh stations. This is a
security concern that needs to be addressed in HWMP. Therefore, a strong anti-replay
scheme is required in order to prevent such attacks from happening in WMNs. The scheme
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must use freshness identifiers such as timestamps and discard any old messages that violate
the freshness of the timestamp.

Notably, usage of the sequence number alone is not

sufficient to thwart replay attacks, as this number is only useful in preventing the formation
of loops while routing.
A RANN frame is usually sent by a mesh station that is announcing itself as the root
node so that all the other mesh stations in the network are aware of its presence. The RANN
frame is similar to a PREQ, and the functionality also matches that of a PREQ to an extent.
The only difference is that, after sending a RANN, the root node does not expect a reply from
other mesh stations. The security requirements for a RANN frame are the same as the
requirements for a PREQ frame, except that no anti-replay schemes are required for RANN
frames.
A PERR frame is sent out by a mesh station in case of errors, such as path
unavailability, wherein a mesh station is not able to find a path to reach another station of
interest. This frame is sent back to the mesh station at the previous hop, indicating the error
type. The contents of this frame require point-to-point authentication and integrity services
for both the mutable and non-mutable fields as well as end-to-end authentication and
integrity services for the non-mutable fields. Since this is merely an error notification frame,
services for an anti-replay scheme, forgery detection, and root permission level are not
necessary for PERR frames.
A PREP frame is sent in response to a PREQ frame as an acknowledgement either by
the destination mesh station or an intermediate mesh station that knows the path to the
destination.

The security requirements for this type of frame include end-to-end

authentication, integrity for non-mutable fields, and encryption for point-to-point

77

communication. Authentication and integrity services are also required for point-to-point
communication for both the mutable and non-mutable fields. The PREP frame is sent as a
response to the source mesh node and, therefore, does not require root permission level
service because the nature of the frame has nothing to do with root announcements.
Similarly, an anti-replay scheme is not necessary in this case as the PREP frame might reach
the source node through any other route; thus, a replay attack does not usually work well
here. However, a strong forgery detection mechanism is desired similar to that for a PREQ.
5.2

Compliance with Security Requirements
The proposed secure version of HWMP meets the security requirements of the WMN

routing protocol. Both the mutable and non-mutable fields of the frames of HWMP are
required to be protected for point-to-point communication.

According to the proposed

approach, all the fields of all frames (PREQ, PREP, PERR, and RANN) are protected
through authentication and integrity services. This safeguards the mutable fields of the
frames from being modified by attackers. The BE scheme, in combination with the noninteractive key agreement scheme, ensures the authentication and integrity of the mutable
fields of the frames, thereby protecting the HWMP frames from external attacks. Every
intermediate node will be able to verify the origin of the frame received and makes sure that
no other nodes in the network have performed illegal modifications. This scheme will serve
as a forgery detection method to stop internal attacks by detecting illegal modifications of the
mutable fields in the HWMP frames. End-to-end authentication and integrity is required for
the non-mutable fields of the HWMP frames. The proposed approach makes use of an IDbased signature scheme, which helps the destination node to verify the signature and make
sure that the fields were not tampered with by any of the intermediate nodes along the way.
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The identity used in this scheme can be the MAC address of the mesh stations. In addition,
this scheme can help in avoiding impersonation attacks as well and incorporates a
mechanism to prevent replay attacks in the network, which could cause serious harm to
network performance.
5.3

Security Analysis of Proposed Scheme
The advantage of the ID-based signature scheme is that it does not require any pairing

operation for signature generation or verification nor does it require the attachment of a
certificate to the signature for verification. Also, the secret key is computed by the PKG, so
the algorithm does not require any secret key information. The non-mutable fields of the
HWMP frame do not change at intermediate nodes and can, therefore, be signed by the
source while the destination should be able to verify the validity of the signature and the
message with the help of the ID-based signature scheme. The detection of compromised
nodes in a WMN is a vast research area and is outside the scope of this dissertation.
Every node in the network authenticates with its one-hop neighbors using the one-hop group
secret.

The BE secret is used for authentication of two-hop neighbors; thus, non-

authenticated nodes cannot join the network unless two nodes turn rogue and collude. The
shared key between two end points of communication prevents illegal deletion of nodes from
the network. Further, the non-interactive key agreement scheme prevents eavesdropping
attacks as the mutual keys are derived without any interaction between the communicating
nodes. Whenever the topology of the network changes, the nodes change their broadcast key
and re-broadcast them for two-hop authentication purposes. So, when a two-hop neighbor of
a particular node becomes its one-hop neighbor, the node changes its broadcast key so that
the newly joined one-hop neighbor node does not have access to the renewed broadcast key.
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The two-hop authentication process using BE keeps the attackers from modifying the
contents of the frame.

Also, the per-hop hashing that is used helps to authenticate

intermediate nodes, which can serve as an additional level of security. One should note that,
while using SAE for deriving and transporting the one-hop group secret key, the pre-shared
common password is assumed to be protected at all times. If a malicious mesh station gets
access to the common shared password or if a healthy mesh station turns rogue, the corrupted
candidate must somehow be detected and quarantined from the network. However, the
detection and elimination of the malicious node is beyond the scope of this work. This paper
mostly focuses on security verification rather than malicious node detection and elimination.
The security analysis of the proposed scheme is presented as follows and includes an
evaluation of the robustness of the proposed scheme against various known attacks.
5.3.1 Path Diversion Attack
An attacker can create a black hole/wormhole by launching a path diversion attack in
a WMN. The attacker can lower the airtime metric in the HWMP frames to smaller values
when compared to other paths, thereby diverting the route taken by the frame to another route
that is desired by the attacker. Also, the attacker can increase the sequence number on such a
frame to trick the victims into believing that this is the most recent frame. The ID-based
online/offline signature scheme helps to detect the illegal modification of the sequence
number by an intermediate node. In addition, the two-hop authentication provided by the BE
technique will detect any fake metric changes by intermediate nodes. If an attacker decides
to alter the metric, the neighboring node would detect the alteration because of the two-hop
authentication that is verified from the node previous to the attack.
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5.3.2 Impersonation Attack
An attacker can gain access to the contents of the HWMP frames by using an
impersonation attack and pretending to be a root mesh station, thus, sending out
announcements to gather replies from the mesh stations.

The ID-based offline/online

signature scheme used in the proposed scheme requires every mesh node to sign the
PREQ/RANN frame before being sent out. Therefore, an impersonation attack becomes
unfeasible because the attacker will not be able to impersonate itself to somebody else, as it
does not have access to the secret user key that is computed and pre-distributed to every
mesh node by a private key generator in order to generate the appropriate digital signature.
5.3.3 Flooding Attack
An external attacker might be able to flood the network by continuously broadcasting
frames with false information. This is a type of denial of service attack and can heavily
impact the performance of a network. In order to avoid such attacks, the proposed scheme
uses one-hop and two-hop authentication alongside a digital signature scheme so that any
non-authenticated broadcasting message will be immediately dropped by any receiving mesh
station in the network.
5.3.4 Passive Attack
An attacker can perform a passive attack in which the main goal is to obtain
important information about the WMN. The proposed scheme uses mesh stations with onehop group secret keys to broadcast secrets for two-hop authentication, which provide
protection against passive attacks because the attacker cannot obtain the contents of the
encrypted message without knowledge of the appropriate keys.
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5.3.5 Replay Attack
To avoid replay attacks in the WMN, a timestamp concept used in [11] is applied in
our proposed framework. This timestamp concept permits a receiving mesh node to validate
the received signed messages based on the time interval within which it has received the
frame.

Consequently, a signed message, injected by a replay attacker, arriving with

timestamp discrepancy will be dropped. The timestamp approach used here is based on the
802.11 MAC layer parameters and on mesh node capabilities in terms of buffering and CPU
processing. Moreover, this proposition of timestamp discrepancy enables mesh nodes to
limit and reduce the redundant messages injected by a replay attacker.
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CHAPTER 6

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

6.1

Simulation Setup
To investigate the performance of the proposed scheme, the time overhead involved

in the processing of the frame must be estimated. The HWMP routing frames—such as the
PREQ, PREP, PERR, RANN, and GANN—are encrypted and will certainly involve
encryption- and decryption-based overhead that should be taken into consideration in the
simulations. The simulations were run on a workstation with Intel® 2.00 GHz CPU and 4
GB of RAM running Ubuntu 12.04 Linux OS with ns-3 installed. Both MIRACL library
[14] and RELIC-toolkit [15] are integrated and compiled with ns-3. Therefore, all simulation
results already include the delay incurred by the cryptographic primitives used in the
proposed scheme.
The proposed secured version of HWMP was implemented in an ns-3 simulator, and
the performance of the protocol was evaluated by comparing it with the standard version of
the HWMP and SHWMP [6]. The ns-3 seemed to be an appropriate simulation tool because
of its support for the 802.11s standard as well as HWMP.
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The network simulation

scenario parameters are listed in Table 6.1. The size of the network in the simulation
scenario is 600m x 600m and consists of a varying number of mesh devices set up using
square grid topology. In order to integrate the online/offline signature scheme and the noninteractive key agreement scheme in HWMP, MIRACL library [14] and RELIC-toolkit
library [15] are used.

Table 6.1 Simulation parameters
Parameter

Value

Area

1020m x 1020m

Number of nodes

9 – 36

Total duration

300 seconds

Distance between nodes

170 m

Topology

Square Grid

Traffic

User Datagram Protocol

Stack

802.11s

Packet size

1024 bytes

Data rate

50 - 400 Kbps

Packet interval

0.1 seconds

Routing protocol

HWMP
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MIRACL stands for Multi-precision Integer and Rational Arithmetic Cryptographic
Library and is available as an open-source software development kit for ECC over GF(p).
This is a convenient-to-use C and C++ library for large integers and rational numbers, which
has all of the necessary primitives for implementing the cryptographic code. It also fully
supports ECC over GF(p) and GF(2m), which is required for the ID-based signature
generation and verification stages of the online/offline signature scheme in the proposed
approach. Further, it offers procedure calls for implementing Diffie-Hellman key exchange,
RSA public key cryptography, Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), and AES encryption. For
resource-constrained systems like wireless mesh networks, Public Key Cryptography (PKC)
techniques are better at handling the key distribution problem than symmetric-key
cryptographic techniques. WMNs may contain devices that do not have great computational
power or have a limited battery life because the computational abilities are limited.
To overcome this problem, ECC seems to be a good solution because it requires less
computational resources than the conventional PKC techniques, such as RSA and DSA.
MIRACL provides all the functions and primitives of ECC, enabling the implementation of
widely known protocols, such as ECDSA and Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman, making it an
optimum choice for an embedded systems environment.
In the proposed approach, the ECC primitives and functions used are focused on the
prime finite fields. This is because using Pseudo-Mersenne primes in GF(p) effectively
optimizes basic arithmetic operations. Finding a suitable elliptic curve is a challenge when
using ECC. Careful consideration must be given while choosing the curve parameters to
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accommodate for efficient computations while, at the same time, providing a sufficient level
of security. For this purpose, NIST recommends using at least 160-bit keys for ECC. This
will attain a security level comparable to the standard RSA-based implementations with a
key size of 1024-bits [35]. In the implementation of an online-offline scheme, the verifiably
random elliptic curve domain parameters (shown in Table 6.2) over Fp are used, which are
generated by a point-counting algorithm known as Schoof’s algorithm that generates a
completely random curve and directly counts the points on it [36].

Table 6.2 Elliptic curve domain parameters used
Key Length

160 bits

p

FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF7FFFFFFF

a

-3

b

44C1A1CE9

q

FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF609BC7611575926DB777

x

A2948EBFEE94136952AFEB4C87FD1B99E6DF632

y

52C9D3E6B2A3FC50FC0D0AD36656383088C31A78
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RELIC-toolkit is a library that is written entirely in C and provides a highly flexible
and customizable implementation of a wide variety of cryptographic algorithms. It has been
developed by researchers at UNICAMP to provide cryptographic tools based on flexibility
and efficiency. It implements the arithmetic of large integers as well as the arithmetic in
binary and prime fields and elliptic curves over prime fields, among others [38]. This not
only includes RSA and ECC, but also includes pairing-based asymmetric cryptography,
Boneh-Lynn-Schacham,

Boneh-Boyen

short

signatures,

Sakai-Ohgishi-Kasahara

authenticated key agreement, and many more. The toolkit provides an option to build only
the desired components for the required platform. While building the library, a variety of
mathematical optimizations that can be combined to obtain the desired performance can be
selected. This includes a multi-precision integer math module, which can be customized to
use different bit-length words. Further, RELIC-toolkit supports curves over prime as well as
binary fields [37].
In the proposed approach, the non-interactive key agreement scheme is used, for
which RELIC-toolkit is a good choice since it implements the Sakai-Ohgishi-Kasahara [39]
authenticated key agreement scheme, which is used for authentication between mesh stations
during the path reply phase of the routing. In the implementation of this scheme in RELICtoolkit, an MSK is generated by a key management service (KMS); then a public key (PK) is
derived from the MSK. For each mesh station, a receiver secret key (RSK) is derived from
the ID of the mesh station, PK and MSK. The public key and the corresponding RSK are
distributed by the KMS to each of the mesh stations prior to routing through the
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authenticated channel. When each mesh station receives the key material, it verifies the
authenticity of the information received. A mesh station will send encapsulated data that is
formed using the KMS public key to another mesh station that it wants to communicate with.
The other mesh station, upon receiving the data, processes it with the RSK and derives a
shared secret that can be used to encrypt the messages between the two nodes under
consideration.
RELIC-toolkit has functions that can be utilized to create MSK and RSK, which are
then used in the PREP phase for authentication between intermediate nodes. The required
keys for this implementation, generated by the KMS, are assumed to have been predistributed among the mesh stations in the network using a suitable key distribution scheme.
Since it is an ID-based key agreement scheme, the IDs of the mesh stations are used as the
identifiers for generating the user private keys.
To evaluate the performance of the proposed secure version of HWMP, the standard
HWMP protocol, SHWMP, [6] and the proposed scheme are subjected to the same
simulation setup.

The three major parameters of interest in this simulation are the

throughput, end-to-end delay, and packet delivery ratio. For a varying number of nodes in
the network and the distance between them, the aforementioned parameters are recorded
from the simulation results, and the performance of the proposed protocol was deduced from
the obtained data. Following are the definitions of the parameters that are used for this
evaluation:
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1)

Throughput: Average rate of bits received over a period of time (difference
between the arrival time of the first and last one) in the network.

2)

End-to-end delay: Average time taken by a data packet to travel from a source
node to the destination node. It can be calculated by dividing the sum of the
time taken by each frame to reach the destination by the number of frames
received from the destination.

3)

Packet delivery ratio: This is the ratio of the number of packets received to the
number of packets sent.

4)

Routing overhead ratio: It is the ratio of the number of routing bytes received to
the number of the data bytes received. When the number or routing bytes
received is equal to the number of the data bytes, the routing overhead ratio
becomes one.

6.2

Simulation Results
Figures 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 display the throughput, end-to-end delay, packet delivery

ratio, and routing overhead ratio respectively, measured against varying transmission rates in
a 3x3, 4x4, 5x5, and 6x6 grid setup.

The grid topology is preferred against random

distribution to achieve a fair comparison of results which may not be achieved reliably in
random distribution due to the random position of nodes.
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a) 3x3 grid

b) 4x4 grid

c) 5x5 grid

d) 6x6 grid

Figure 6.1 Throughput vs. transmission rate
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a) 3x3 grid

b) 4x4 grid

c) 5x5 grid

d) 6x6 grid

Figure 6.2 End-to-end delay vs. transmission rate
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a) 3x3 grid

b) 4x4 grid

c) 5x5 grid

d) 6x6 grid

Figure 6.3 Packet delivery ratio vs. transmission rate
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a) 3 × 3 grid

b) 4 × 4 grid

d) 6 × 6 grid

c) 5 × 5 grid

Figure 6.4: Routing overhead ratio vs. transmission rate
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6.3

Discussion
The figures show that, although the proposed secure version of HWMP (SecHWMP)

does suffer in terms of throughput, end-to-end delay and packet delivery ratio, it still
performs significantly better even with multiple security mechanisms involved, which are
employed to protect both the mutable and non-mutable fields of the HWMP routing frames.
For a given grid size, as the transmission rate increases, the bits are received faster by
the receiving nodes. Therefore, the throughput of the network increases with increasing
transmission rate. As the network (grid) size increases, the number of connections between
the nodes increases which means the number of transmitting and receiving node pairs
increases. This results in an increase in the overall number of bits in the network that are
being received by the receiving nodes resulting in an increase in throughput.
It can also be observed from the results that in the worst-case scenario, when
compared to the standard HWMP protocol, the throughput of the proposed approach suffers
only a 29% decrease in a densely populated 5x5 grid. Similarly, the end-to-end delay suffers
a worst-case 30% decrease in a 6x6 grid and is considerably better than the expected
performance for the proposed approach. The worst-case packet delivery ratio from the
simulation results is approximately 48% lesser than the standard HWMP. According to the
definition of routing overhead ratio, a decrease in the ratio indicates that more data bytes are
being received without requiring more routing bytes. In a 3 × 3 grid, although the bit rate
increases, the packet delivery ratio does not decrease. This indicates that more data bytes are
being received with the same number of routing bytes. Thus, the routing overhead ratio
proportionately decreases with increasing bit rate. In denser grids, as the bit rate increases,
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the packet delivery ratio decreases. This indicates that more frames are being lost due to
which more routing bytes are generated resulting in increased routing overhead ratio.
Thus, the proposed scheme provides integrity assurance from the source node to the
destination node to protect against NMF modification attacks as well as security features for
PERR frames and robustness against internal attacks, protections that are not provided by
SHWMP. One should note that these features are incorporated at the sacrifice of slight
performance degradation when compared to SHWMP and the standard HWMP protocol, but
this scheme is worth the performance degradation when considering the seriousness of WMN
security concerns.
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CHAPTER 7

SOFTWARE/HARDWARE IMPLEMENTATION

7.1

Software/Hardware Setup
To evaluate the performance of the proposed version of HWMP, a test-bed has been

set up with the necessary hardware to ensure proper protocol function and to compare the
performance with the simulation results. In order to accomplish this, a network of nodes
comprising of single-board computers running a minimal version of Linux with Wi-Fi
capabilities has been constructed. The purpose of these nodes is to serve as mesh stations. In
addition to these mesh stations are two workstations with Wi-Fi capabilities. One of these
workstations serves as a source node and the other as a destination node. The network is set
up in such a way that when a source node generates a path request, it navigates through the
mesh stations before reaching the destination node, hence, replicating a WMN.
This section describes the WMN setup for performance evaluation of the proposed
secure version of HWMP. The experimental setup of the network is explained first, followed
by a discussion of the test experiments that were conducted to evaluate the performance of
the protocol.
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7.1.1 Hardware Setup
The WMN setup consists of a source node, which is a workstation that is running a
widely used Linux distribution, Ubuntu 12.04 LTS and another workstation running Ubuntu
12.04, which serves as a destination node mesh station. Between these two workstations,
several PC Engine Alix boards are running Debian 6.0, another well-known variant of Linux
distribution. These Alix boards serve as MPs and MAPs of the wireless mesh network.
The following provides the specifications of the workstation used as source node in
the network:
•

CPU: Intel(R) CPU T2080 @ 1.73 GHz

•

Memory: 1012 MB

•

Hard Disk: 80 GB

•

OS Type: Linux

•

OS Release: Ubuntu 12.04 (Precise)

•

Kernel: 3.5.0-36-generic

•

GCC Version: 4.6 (i686-linux-gnu)

•

Wireless Interface Description

•

Network Adapter: AR242x / AR542x (PCI-Express)

•

Configuration: broadcast=yes
driver=ath5k
driver-version=3.5.0-36-generic
wireless=IEEE 802.11bg
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The specifications of the workstation used as the destination node in the network are
as follows:
•

CPU: AMD A6-5200 APU @ 2.00 GHz

•

Memory: 4000 MB

•

Hard Disk: 320 GB

•

OS Type: Linux

•

OS Release: Ubuntu 12.04 (Precise)

•

Kernel: 3.5.0-36-generic

•

GCC Version: 4.6 (i686-linux-gnu)

•

Network Adapter: AR242x / AR542x (PCI-Express)

•

Configuration: broadcast=yes
driver=ath5k
driver-version=3.5.0-36-generic
wireless=IEEE 802.11bg

In terms of hardware, the single-board computers used in this implementation are
PCEngine ALIX 3d2. A 4GB Sandisk Ultra Compact Flash (CF) card was used to store the
operating system and files. Two Compex WLM54G23 wireless network cards that support
the 802.11a/b/g and are based on the Atheros AR5414 chipset were inserted into the mini
Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) slots in each of the embedded systems along with
two subminiature version A (SMA) Omni-directional antennas. The PCEngine ALIX 3d2
specifications are as follows:
•

CPU: 500 MHz AMD Geode LX800

•

DRAM: 256 MB DDR DRAM
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•

Storage: CompactFlash socket

•

Power: DC jack or passive POE, min. 7V to max. 20V

•

Expansion: 2 mini PCI slots, Low Pin Count (LPC) bus

•

Connectivity: 1 Ethernet (Via VT6105M 10/100)

•

Input/Output: DB9 serial port, dual USB

•

Board size: 100 × 160 mm

•

Firmware: tinyBIOS

7.1.2 Linux Kernel Anatomy
This section will briefly explore the anatomy of the kernel of Linux operating systems
and its major subsystems. A glimpse of the top-level system architecture of the Linux
operating system can be seen in Figure 7.1.

Figure 7.1 Basic architecture of the Linux operating system [32]

99

The operating system can be visualized as having two parts: application space and
kernel space. User applications are executed in the application space, most commonly
referred as the user space. The user space also contains the GNU C Library, which acts as an
interface between the user space and the kernel by providing a connection to the System Call
Interface. This allows for the user application to interact with the kernel and is necessary, as
the kernel and user application have different protected address spaces.
The kernel can further be divided into three sub-levels: 1) basic functions, such as
read and write, which are implemented by the system call interface; 2) architectureindependent kernel code, which is common to any architecture of the processor provided it is
supported by Linux; and 3) architecture-dependent kernel code, which is platform-specific
for a particular architecture. The major components of the Linux kernel are shown in Figure
7.2.

Figure 7.2 Major subsystems of the Linux kernel [32]
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In this dissertation, the sub-system of interest is the network stack of the kernel, as it
contains the IEEE 802.11 wireless communication protocols, which also includes WMNs.
The network stack has a seven-layered architecture, as shown in Figure 7.3, wherein each
layer has a specific functionality that allows for communication over the network. The
Application layer belongs to the user space while the next five layers belong to the kernel
space, followed by the Physical layer. When an application is invoked by the user at the
Application layer, the System Call Interface makes the call from the Application layer to the
kernel. The Protocol Agnostic Interface then creates a socket with a specific ID for each
application. The Network Protocol is responsible for providing routing information as well
as transmitting and receiving data. The data from the kernel is connected to the network
device drivers through the Device Agnostic Interface.

The data is then prepared for

transmission over the medium in the Device Drivers layer. The data packets are transmitted
or received through the physical hardware in the Physical Hardware layer.
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Figure 7.3 Linux network stack [33]

7.1.3 Linux Wireless Subsystem Architecture
This section will briefly summarize the overall network architecture and wireless
subsystem architecture of a Linux operating system to help understand the working of
WMNs on Linux-based platforms. Linux is often the preferred choice of operating system
for running powerful servers handling heavy network-related services since it has been
equipped with extraordinary support for network operations from its inception. Figure 7.4
summarizes the complex network architecture of the Linux operating system.
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Figure 7.4 Linux network architecture

Once the Linux kernel is up and running, the network device drivers that are
responsible for managing the network devices are loaded and await requests for
transmitting/receiving data from the Application layer.

The user applications usually

exchange data with a TCP/IP protocol stack through the socket library, which is made
available by the operating system. Because the MAC facilities were not provided by the
initial IEEE 802.11 stack implementations in Linux, it became easier to develop device
drivers and port them to different operating systems. However, operational inconsistency
was prevalent in cases where, even under the same conditions, different cards were used to
function differently. In order to overcome this problem and establish consistency in network
operations, SoftMAC implementation was introduced as a new software layer that essentially
implements all (or most) of the MAC functionalities common to all device drivers in the
IEEE 802.11 stack.

In this situation, net80211 and mac80211 are the two primary

implementations of the SoftMAC layer in Linux [29]. net80211 supports only Atheros’s
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hardware and is usually coupled with the madwifi driver, which supports Atheros chipsets.
Seeing this focus on a single manufacturer as a problem, mac80211 was introduced for
SoftMAC implementation in the Linux kernel’s main branch. The block diagram of the
architecture involving mac80211 is shown in Figure 7.5.
Several modules are present in the kernel, which are responsible for wireless
hardware configuration and data transmission. Hardware configuration is usually done at the
user space, and the cfg80211 module in the kernel is accessed through a nl80211 netlink
interface.

cfg80211 is responsible for implementing the configuration options, such as

scanning the AP and managing the encryption of the transmission through the wireless
channel. On the other hand, mac80211 is responsible for the MAC implementation software
used by wireless devices. It is also responsible for constructing 802.11 frames, implementing
algorithms for rate control, and interacting directly with the device drivers to transmit and
receive data, provided the ieee80211_ops interface is implemented in the drivers. Note that,
with the help of wireless extensions, support for the interfaces of the old wireless driver
framework is still available.
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Figure 7.5 Linux wireless subsystem architecture [31]

7.1.4 WMN Setup
The source and destination workstations are running Ubuntu 12.04 LTS Linux, and
the Alix boards are running a Debian 6.0 variant of Linux. The reason for choosing Ubuntu
for the desktop and laptop is the fact that it is widely used for research and personal use with
a straightforward installation procedure and very good documentation in addition to active
community-supported forums. Debian 6.0 is a light-weight Linux OS that is suitable for
embedded computers like Alix 3D2 boards. For the test-bed, Ubuntu 12.04 and Debian 6.0
versions of Linux have been chosen because they are the latest versions and provide all of the
necessary tools needed to install the open80211s package.
open80211s is an open-source, vendor-neutral implementation of the wireless mesh
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standard IEEE 802.11s, created through a collaboration of companies, and is regarded as a
reference implementation of the 802.11s WMN standard on the Linux operating system.
Refer to Figure 7.6 for a depiction of its integration into the Linux kernel.

As this

implementation is based on a mac80211 wireless stack of Linux kernel, any supporting
wireless cards should be able to run open80211s. Also, since the changes introduced into the
MAC layer by 802.11s are minimal, the entire 802.11s stack is easy to implement in software
and to run on legacy 802.11s cards that are available in the market. Included in the Linux
kernel since 2008, open80211s is a good choice for the WMN test-bed implementation in this
dissertation.

Figure 7.6 Integration of open80211s into the Linux kernel [34]

In this dissertation, the objective of the test-bed implementation is to install
open80211s on two workstations running Ubuntu as well as several single-board computers,
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acting as mesh stations and running a light-weight version of Linux known as Debian. This
test-bed aims to create a WMN with the aforementioned devices and test the functionality of
the proposed secure version of HWMP.
In order to implement the proposed secure version of HWMP in the test-bed, the
cryptographic libraries used in this research, MIRACL and RELIC-toolkit, have been
installed on the necessary workstations and the mesh stations. Other necessary packages
have been installed and steps have been followed to form a WMN with two workstations and
mesh stations. The following outlines the steps taken to complete this action:
1) open80211s package can be downloaded from the Git repository by using the
following command:
git clone git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/linville/wirelesstesting.git --depth=1

2) The repository should download a directory titled ‘wireless-testing’. The following
commands must be run to install the open80211s package:
sudo
sudo
sudo
sudo
sudo
sudo

apt-get
apt-get
apt-get
apt-get
apt-get
apt-get

install
install
install
install
install
install

-y fakeroot
-y build-essential
-y git-core
-y kernel-package
libncurses5
ncurses-dev

3) After installing the packages, change to the “wireless-testing” directory and run the
following commands:
$ cd wireless-testing
$ cp /boot/config-`uname -r` .config
$ make menuconfig

4) Make sure the following settings are selected in the kernel configuration:
Networking —> Wireless —>
<M> Improved wireless configuration API
<M> Generic IEEE 802.11 Networking Stack (mac80211)

5) Enable the ath5k drivers as follows in the kernel configuration:
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Device Drivers —> Network device support —> Wireless LAN —>
<M> Atheros 5xxx wireless cards support

6) After installing the necessary packages and ensuring that the settings are as
discussed above, the WMN must be set up among the devices in the network. The
following commands must be run on each device to allow it to function as a mesh
point:
sudo
sudo
sudo
sudo
sudo
sudo
sudo
sudo

stop network-manager
iw dev wlan0 interface add mesh0 type mp
ifconfig -a | grep mesh0
iw dev mesh0 set channel 2
ifconfig mesh0 192.168.3.1 up
iw dev mesh0 mesh join myMesh
ifconfig mesh0
iw dev mesh0 info

7.1.5 WMN Topology
Each device in the network will now act as a wireless mesh station ready to peer with
other mesh stations with similar configurations. Mesh stations with the same IDs will
automatically create peer links with each other in the default configuration. In Figure 7.7, the
layout of the test-bed for hardware implementation is shown.

The goal of this

implementation is for the client to find a path to the gateway through the mesh routers using
the proposed secure version of HWMP.
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Figure 7.7 WMN test-bed
The establishment of peer links can be observed with the following command, the
result of which is shown in Figure 7.8:
iw dev mesh0 station dump

Figure 7.8 Mesh station dump
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Each station stanza in the station dump output represents a mesh node with which it
has a peer link. The first line shows the MAC address of the mesh node. The “mesh plink”
field reports the state of the peer link with this mesh node. When this value is ESTAB, direct
communication with this mesh node is possible.
One should now be able to ping any node in the mesh. After doing so, “arp” and “iw”
can be used to inspect the ‘arp’ table and path table. This will reveal the location where the
packet was actually sent in order to get to its destination. The results of the “ping” command
and “arp” commands are shown in Figures 7.9 and 7.10, respectively.

Figure 7.9 “Ping” Statistics

Figure 7.10 “arp” statistics
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As shown in Figure 7.10, the hardware address of the destination node can be
observed from the “arp” table. This is useful for interpreting the output of the “mpath dump''
command. The “mpath dump” shows the table that the mesh stack uses to route packets, as
shown in Figure 7.11 below. This table is constructed as the mesh stack successfully
establishes paths to destinations in the mesh. Each output line shows the destination address
in the first column and the next hop address in the second column.

Figure 7.11 “mpath” dump

7.2

Implementation Status
So far, a WMN has been set up among the mesh stations in the network. Now, the

routing protocol of WMNs, HWMP, must be modified to incorporate the cryptographic
methods that are being used in combination with the default routing protocol to provide the
security features as desired. The source code for HWMP is located in the kernel files of the
operating system. Modifying the kernel source code is a tedious task and must be done
carefully, as errors could cause devastating effects. Currently, the research is at the point in
which the source code of HWMP is being subjected to careful modification in order to
incorporate the proposed schemes.
Implementation of the proposed secure version of HWMP involves modifying the
“wireless-testing” kernel source code for HWMP in the open80211s package [28]. First, this
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kernel was configured and compiled to include the mac80211 stack with mesh capabilities,
and the drivers were enabled for the wireless chipset being used. An initial experiment to run
the standard HWMP protocol on the test-bed was successful. The next step in the study
involves modifying the Linux kernel source code for HWMP to include the security schemes
as discussed in the previous sections. After the successful recompilation of the Linux kernel
with the required changes, the performance of the proposed version of HWMP will be
evaluated. Modifying the kernel source code of HWMP could also involve corresponding
modifications to several dependent modules in the kernel. Therefore, extreme caution is
advised to avoid misconfiguring the kernel, thereby rendering the entire experiment useless.
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CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

WMNs are a promising form of technology that have the potential to solve the lastmile problem and overcome the shortcomings of the Wireless Local Area Networks
(WLANs) by providing Internet access to both moving and stationary devices in a network
[23].

Addressing the security issues of WMNs is of the utmost importance given the

prominence that these networks have gained in today’s research and deployment [24].
Moreover, efficient and secure routing protocols are a strong requirement in WMNs to
support real-time applications and services. Many studies are actively pursuing a secure
framework for routing protocols in WMNs. However, the existing research in this area
assumes that the internal nodes are trustworthy and not colluded, which is not a safe
assumption to make in terms of network security and can result in many attacks against the
network through internal nodes [25].
In this dissertation, the security concerns of HWMP, the default routing protocol of
WMNs, are identified. Based on the evaluation of the security requirements of WMNs, a
security framework for HWMP is proposed, which integrates two security schemes: an
offline/online signature scheme to provide end-to-end authentication to the non-mutable
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fields of HWMP and a non-interactive key agreement scheme coupled with a BE scheme to
provide point-to-point security to the mutable fields of HWMP. This is accomplished by
embedding extra fields within the existing routing frames of HWMP that carry additional
authentication information for the nodes to verify before processing or forwarding the
frames. Finally, the performance of the proposed secure version of HWMP is evaluated by
comparing it to the traditional HWMP protocol through extensive simulations in the ns-3
simulator. The simulation results show that the proposed version of HWMP suffers from
performance degradation due to the additional security mechanisms that are used. However,
the simulation results also show that the proposed version can perform well even with the
security features incorporated when compared to the existing standard HWMP protocol,
proving that this performance degradation is slight enough to be acceptable.
Although the simulation results highlight the effectiveness of the proposed scheme,
real-time implementation of the proposed version on hardware would add much more
credibility to the proposal [27]. With this intention, efforts were made to implement the
proposed version of HWMP on real-time systems with WMN capabilities, such as computers
and mobile devices capable of running HWMP. A network model based on a client-server
type architecture was developed to test the performance of HWMP. In this model, a client
(mobile device), such as a laptop, attempts to find a path to the server, such as a desktop,
through a collection of intermediate nodes, which are small-scale computer boards running
Linux.

All of the systems in the network are running open80211s, an open-source

implementation of the IEEE 802.11s wireless mesh standard, which implements HWMP for
path discovery among the nodes [26]. Initial attempt to run standard HWMP on the test-bed
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was accomplished by modifying the HWMP portion of the ‘wireless-testing’ kernel source
code in open80211s package.
Future work includes incorporating the security schemes, discussed in this
dissertation, in the kernel source code of HWMP in the open80211s package to evaluate the
performance of the proposed secure version of HWMP in real-time test bed setup, mentioned
earlier. This performance evaluation will serve as a benchmark and allow for a better
understanding of the performance of the proposed scheme and opens new directions for
further research to improve the performance and security features of the protocol.
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APPENDIX A

RELIC TOOLKIT

Installation
The build process requires the CMake cross-platform build system. This should make RELIC
available in all platforms supported by CMake. The following installation was performed on a 32
bit machine with Ubuntu 12.04 LTS as OS.
Compilation
In the steps below, replace version by the release version.
First of all, extract the RELIC release archive:
tar xzvf relic-version.tar.gz

This should create a directory named relic-version. Create a target directory:
mkdir -p relic-target

Install cmake using the following command
sudo apt-get install cmake

Run cmake inside the target directory:
cd relic-target
cmake -DWORD=32 ../relic-0.3.4

…...........................(1)
DWORD is used to describe if the system is 32/64 bit
CMake will detect a suitable C compiler and show all the customization options. For now, just
compile the library:
make
cd ..

….............................(2)

By default, static and shared libraries will be built in the relic-target/lib directory. Tests and
benchmarks should be present in relic-target/bin. You can run the automated tests by running
each binary independently or by using CTest:
cd relic-target
ctest
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The customization options are described in BuildOptions. You can change these by installing
ccmake
sudo apt-get install cmake-curses-gui

and running:
ccmake relic-target

If you are using one of the provided configuration presets, make sure it is applied to an empty
target folder. Presets were not designed to provide full configurations or to fix bad ones, but only
to override some of the defaults.
Installation
Installation is not required but can be done with:
make install

By default, CMake installs binaries and headers into the /usr/local/ prefix. You can change this
by passing a DESTDIR= variable along with the make install command.
Standalone Test of Sakai-Ohgishi-Kasahara ID-based key agreement Scheme
In test_cp.c files present in /relic-0.3.4/test directory, there is a module which verifies the sakai
scheme. You could modifiy the IDs and give a master key and verify if the program generates the
same shared key. When you modify the test_cp.c file, do a ‘cmake’ and then ‘make’ as discussed
in the previous section (steps 1 and 2).
In summary, the Base Station generates a master key and uses it to generate the private key
of each node. Each node is then loaded with two parameters
1. Node ID
2. Private Key
Each node can generate the shared key that is used between two nodes using other node's ID.
This shared key must be subjected to a key derivation function to obtain a meaningful key for
cryptosystems.
Integration with HWMP
- Write a C program “test.c” to do the NIKAS scheme in a standalone
- Make sure you have both the folders - “relic-0.3.4” and “relic-target” available
- Run the program (type the command “make”) with relic library “librelic_s.a” using the
“Makefile”
- Makefile and test.c are located in “NIKAS Test” folder
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Makefile
RELIC_SOURCE=/home/yoda/relic-0.3.4
RELIC_TARGET=/home/yoda/relic-target
CFLAGS += -I ${RELIC_SOURCE}/include -I ${RELIC_TARGET}/include
CFLAGS += -L ${RELIC_TARGET}/lib
LDFLAGS += -lrelic_s -lrt
CC=gcc
OBJECTS=test.o
SOURCE=test.c
client: $(OBJECTS)
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(OBJECTS) -o test $(LDFLAGS)
all:test
.PHONY: clean
clean:
rm -f *~ *.o test

test.c
#include <stdio.h>
#include "relic.h"
#include "relic_test.h"
int main(void)
{
core_init();
pc_param_set_any();
sokaka_t s_i;
bn_t s;
unsigned char key1[MD_LEN], key2[MD_LEN];
char id_a[5] = { 'A', 'l', 'i', 'c', 'e' };
char id_b[5] = { 'B', 'o', 'b','b','y' };
sokaka_null(s_i);
sokaka_new(s_i);
bn_new(s);
cp_sokaka_gen(s);
cp_sokaka_gen_prv(s_i, id_a, 5, s);
cp_sokaka_key(key1, MD_LEN, id_a, 5, s_i, id_b, 5);
cp_sokaka_gen_prv(s_i, id_b, 5, s);
cp_sokaka_key(key2, MD_LEN, id_b, 5, s_i, id_a, 5);
if(memcmp(key1, key2, MD_LEN) == 0)
{
printf("\n Key Agreement Successful\n");
}
sokaka_free(s_i);
core_clean();
}
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APPENDIX B

MIRACL

-- The files ecsgen_1.c, ecssign_1.c, and ecsver_1.c are the three files that perform the ID based
online/offline signature scheme.

-- compile the .c programs using the following command linking the miracl.a library generated from
the above step
gcc testctd.c -o testctd.out miracl.a

-- To run ECDSA programs in Linux 32 bit
gcc -m32 ecsgen.c miracl.a -o ecsgen.out

-- To generate random elliptic curve domain parameters
cd miracl
./schoof -f 2^160-2^31-1 -3 18456648937 -o common.ecs

Note: Copy pasting the following values into common.ecs might result in errors. So execute the
schoof command every time you need the parameters to be used.

-- This should generate the parameters as follows in common.ecs file:
bits = 160
p = FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF7FFFFFFF -- modulus p
a = -3
b = 44C1A1CE9
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q = FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF609BC7611575926DB777 -- order q
x = A2948EBFEE94136952AFEB4C87FD1B99E6DF632
y = 52C9D3E6B2A3FC50FC0D0AD36656383088C31A78
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